Philosophy and Religion / J. C. Chatterji: Hindu Realism

    Jagadish Chandra Chatterji

    Hindu Realism

    A—The Analytic Aspect

    The Akasha

    The existence of the fifth Reality (Akasha) is maintained on the following grounds1:—

    A Medium of Connection Between the Discrete Wanted.

    The Paramarius are like pure points. We have seen that they produce things of limited magnitude; but they cannot do so if they actually touch one another. For in that case they can only produce points. They produce things by standing away from one another and yet being joined. That is to say, they unite not contiguously but mediately. And as they are joined together mediately, there must be some Reality which, being in touch with different Paramanus which are otherwise separate from one another, serves as a medium for their union.2

    The Medium Must be a Continuum. It is Akasha.

    This medium of union must be a non-discrete Reality or a Continuum which is in touch with all discrete things; in other words, is all-pervading. For if it be not such, it must ultimately consist of Paramanus like all other discrete things;3 and these Paramanus must be conceived as producing it only by standing at certain distances from one another.4 But if it be produced in this way, then we shall be under the necessity of assuming that there must be some other thing, besides itself, which serves as a medium for the union of its Paramanus. In that case, this latter substance will be the all-pervading continuum. That there must be an all-pervading continuum, to serve as a medium for the union of discrete things, cannot very well be doubted. And as there is no proof of the existence of, and no reason to suppose that there exists, any other discrete form of things besides the four we have already named, we must admit that the Reality, which serves as a medium for the union of the Paramanus of the four sensible forms, is itself a continuum. This all-pervading continuum and universal medium of union of discrete things is called Akasha. And, as suggested before, we may perhaps translate it as Ether, bearing in mind that, from the standpoint of Hindu Realism, it does not possess exactly the same properties as those ascribed to Ether by modern Western Science.

    Sound is not a Property of the Discrete Sensible

    That Akasha exists, we must admit, says the Vaisheshika, for another reason also. We have seen, in a general way, that the quality of sound cannot be said to inhere in any of the four forms of sensible matter we have named.5 It is, no doubt, produced by the movements of one or other of the four classes of sensible matter, and they may even be needed to communicate it to a perceiving being like ourselves. The Hindu says they may be needed for this purpose, because nobody has ever yet entered a vacuum and tried to find out whether or not sound could be communicated to us without them.6 While thus the movements of the four forms of matter are necessary for its production, and perhaps for its communication, sound cannot be said to inhere in any of them: because a quality, which can be said to inhere in a discrete thing of a particular type, has the following characteristics:—

    Characteristics of special qualities inherent in the discrete sensible.

    (a) It endures as long as the thing endures in that particular form,7
    (b) It can never be separated from the thing unless the latter undergoes some radical or chemical change.8
    (c) It reappears in any combination, with other things, of the thing in which it inheres,—such a combination being of the nature in which its different factors can be distinguished from one another, as for instance, a mosaic.9

    These Wanting in Sound.

    None of these conditions holds good of sound in its relation to any sensible matter, (a) There is nothing in which the sound lasts as long as the thing lasts in that condition, for all sensible things can be conceived as being perfectly silent, that is, soundless.10 (b) There is nothing from which sound cannot be entirely eliminated.11 (c) And, finally, the sound produced by a thing, which is itself produced by the combination of a number of things still distinguishable from one another in the combination, is never exactly the same as the combined sounds of the parts of which the thing is composed.12 For instance, the sound produced by a violin, is absolutely different (i) from that produced by any of the separate parts of which the violin is a combination and which are still distinguished from one another in their combination as the violin; or (ii) from that which may be conceived as the combination of the separate sounds produced by the separate parts.

    For all these reasons it must be admitted that sound does not inhere like temperature, colour, flavour or odour in any form of discrete sensible matter.

    Quality Must Inhere in Reality. Sound not Subjective. It Inheres in Akasha.

    Yet it is a quality, and as such must inhere in some Reality. For, as a quality, it can have no independent existence of its own. There is no example whatever of a quality having such an independent existence, and sound cannot be an exception to this universal rule.13 Nor can it be said that it is purely subjective and inheres in the perceiving entity. For, if it were subjective and inherent in the percipient, then one would feel it to be part and parcel of oneself as, say, pain or pleasure, or a thought and an idea. But nobody feels in this way when a bell rings and he hears the sound. He does not think or feel that it is his sound. He rather feels that the sound proceeds from where the bell rings. Therefore, it cannot be said to inhere in the perceiving being. Moreover, all the reasons which support us in our idea that the qualities perceived by the other special senses belong, not to the percipient being, but to things other than the percipient, apply also in the case of sound. If those qualities are not inherent in the percipient, neither is sound. In this way, it can be shown that there is nothing among the otherwise known things in which sound inheres. We must, therefore, conclude that, in addition to everything else which is known otherwise, there must be some other Reality in which sound inheres; and it is this Reality which is Akasha. In Akasha all discrete things move and as they move they produce sounds not in themselves, that is, as a property inherent in themselves, but in the medium in which they move.14 And it is obvious that, this medium is Akasha which connects all discrete things.

    Akasha is Eternal.

    Thus we find that Akasha exists, and we have already seen that it is and must be an all pervading continuum; and being a continuum,15 it must also be eternal, unproduced and indestructible. For, as mentioned before, production and destruction of a thing can only mean the bringing together of parts in a certain way, and their separation or re-arrangement,—things which are both impossible in the case of a continuum. Therefore it is eternal.

    Akasha is Motionless.

    It is also absolutely motionless.16 For, being a continuum, it cannot be conceived as moving from one place to another, nor can it contract and expand, which can mean only the bringing closer together, or throwing farther apart, of parts or particles—things which are possible only in discrete substances. Neither is there any undulatory movement in it, for that even means displacement of parts, namely, their moving up and down or back and forth.

    Akasha is Supersensible.

    Finally, Akasha is super-sensible, as it neither is, nor can ever be, perceived by the senses.17 For everything that is perceived by the senses is so perceived by means of some contrast. Contrast, again, means some sort of distinction and isolation, neither of which is possible in regard to Akasha. Being a uniform continuum, (i.e., not being aneka-dravya-vat), there can be no distinction made between different parts of itself. Similarly, being all-pervading, it can never be isolated from other things so as to enable us to distinguish it from them. Thus Akasha is, and must be, super-sensible.

    The Sense of Hearing is Only Akasha Conditioned.

    But although itself super-sensible, its special property, sound, is perceived by means of a special sense.

    This special sense, that is, hearing, therefore, must be essentially of the same nature as Akasha itself; and this for the same reasons which led us to conclude that the four other special senses are essentially of the same nature as the Paramanus which produce the qualities that the special senses severally reveal to us.18 Only, in the case of hearing, we have to admit that it is produced not by any part of Akasha being actually separated off or built into something else,—for such things are impossible in the case of a continuum,—but by its being only conditioned in particular ways, by means of the peculiar structure of the ear. This structure, being interfered with, may make alterations in the particular conditioning of Akasha, and thus only can it be said that hearing is destroyed.

    The Bhutas or Matter.

    So far, then, we find five classes of entities as eternal Realities, and therefore ultimate constituents of the Universe, namely:—

    (1) Prithivi Paramanus, or odorous minima,
    (2) Ap Paramanus, or flavour producing minima,
    (3) Tejah Paramanus, or luminous minima,
    (4) Vayu Paramanus, or thermal minima, and
    (5) Akasha, ethereal continuum, or simply Ether.

    They are all super-sensible. Only their products are sensible. That is to say, it is only the four forms of perceptible matter, with their various qualities, produced by the four classes of Paramanus in their various combinations, and the various sounds produced in Akasha, which are sensible.

    These five classes are collectively called the Bhfitas.19 We may translate the term as Matter, which, as Paramanus and Akasha, is, of course, absolutely simple and uncompounded.

    Footnotes

    1. In all the later works on Nyaya-Vaish., the existence of Akasha is supported exclusively on the ground of its being the basis of sound. The opening Sutra of Kanada of the section on Akasha (Vaish. Su., III. i. 20) is now regarded as expressing a view which is that of the Sankhyas. This Sutra says that we must admit the existence of Akasha because there must be a medium to supply room for the discrete sensible things to move about (sanchara, according to both Upask. and Vivr. The Sutra itself says ‘coming out and going in.’) This reason, however, say the two commentaries named above, is set aside by Kanada in the next Sutra. This interpretation seems doubtful and may have originated with the author of Upask. Shankara Mishra wrote the Upask. relying only on the Sutras as he himself tells us (introductory verse 3); and it is not unlikely that much of his interpretation is only his own invention. That his interpretation of the section on Akasha is his own there is reason to suspect. Tarkika-Raksha, which is an older work than Upask., seems to take the opening Sutra as embodying not the view of the Sankhya but of the Vaisheshika itself. (Tar. Rak., p. 123). Chandra-Kanta in his Bhashya also takes the same view. (Chan. Bhash. on II. i. 20 et seq.)

    The only serious objection to the interpretation of Tar. Rak. and Chan. Bhash. being correct is that Nya-Var. also maintains that the existence of Akasha can be maintained only on the ground of its being the basis of sound. NyA. Var., III. i. 72, p. 400.

    On the other hand Nyava-Vaish., like the other systems, refers constantly to Akasha as the room and locality, one of! the supports (adhara), if not the only support, of all discrete things; Ki. Va., p. 35; Kandali, p. 22 (line 10 from bottom); Prashasta speaks of all the other Bhutas as existing in Akasha (pp. 48 last line to p. 49, line 7).

    Thus it would seem that Tar. Rak. and Chan. Bhash. are quite right in taking the Sutra, II. i. 20, as setting forth the view of the Vaisheshika itself.

    This conclusion would be greatly strengthened if we could rely on the reading of the Sutras as given by Gangadhara in his edition of the Vaisheshika. He reads the Sutra, II. i. 5, as Ta akashe vidyante,’ instead of Ta akashe na vidyante.’ And he seems to interpret it as follows:—Those objective things (Te vishayah)-exist in Akasha.—(Ganga., p. 42).

    For all these reasons I have given two lines of argument in support of Akasha instead of only the usual Shabdadharatva or Shabdashrayatva (sound-supportingness) of most of the later Vaisheshika works.

    In any case the arguments given in here are quite in harmony with and based on authoritative texts.

    2. Nya. Bhash., IV. ii. 21, line 15.

    3. Nya. Su. Nya., Bhash., IV. II. 21; Vaish. Su., VIII. i. 22; Prashasta, p. 58, line 16. Kandall p. 82, line 15, etc.

    4. The all-pervasiveness of Akasha is often supported on other grounds. The arguments given here are based on what is called Dharmigrahaka-pramana, i.e., an argument which proves at once both the existence and characteristic of a thing, like the one proving the existence of Manas or of Kala, as well as their nature. Part of the argument is also what is. called ‘laghava,’ i.e., that of the simplest theory. See Nya. Vrit. on IV. i. 28, where eternity of Akasha is said to be so established (dharmigrahaka-manena laghava-sahakritena).

    5. Cha. Ka., Vol. I, pp. 159 and 172-173.

    6. Ibid.

    7. Vaish. Su., II. i. 24, 25 and 26 (implied).

    8. Prashasta, p. 58, lines 8-10.

    9. Vivr., p. 487, lines et seq (implied).

    10. Vaish. Su., II. i. 24-26.

    11. Prashasta, p. 58, lines 8-10.

    12. V vr., p. 437, lines et seq.

    13. Vivr., p. 437, lines 1, 2, 3; Vaish. Su., II. i. 26; Prashasta, p. 58, lines 10-12.

    14. Vaish. Su., II. i. 27; Prashasta, p. 58; lines 13 and 14

    15. Vaish, Su., II. i. 28; Prashasta, p. 68, lines 17-19.

    16. Vaish. Su. V. ii. 21.

    17. Vaish. Su., IV. i. 6.; VIII. i. 6 and 7.

    18. Nya. Var., III. ii. 72, p. 400. Nya. Bhash., III. ii. 73, Prashasta, pp. 58, 59.

    19. Nya. Su. or Nya. Bhash., I. i. 13. Prashasta, p. 22.




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