Philosophy and Religion / J. C. Chatterji: Hindu Realism

Jagadish Chandra Chatterji

Hindu Realism

A—The Analytic Aspect

The Atman.

Atman Recognized by all the Systems.

The question of the existence of Atman, that is to say, the eighth class of Realities, has been treated most elaborately. But as the Vaisheshika doctrine in this respect has been fairly correctly represented in the West, I shall give here only a few of the most characteristic arguments which are adduced in its support. And I shall give these not only from the Nyaya-Vaisheshika, but from the other systems as well; because while the various schools have had different teachings as to the nature of the Atman, they all have alike taught its existence as an independent, eternal, and infinite Reality, lying, so to say, at the background of every experiencing entity.

In regard to the nature of the Atman, the Creationist standard shows it to be that Reality in which consciousness or experience is only sustained, but of which experience is not an essential, an absolutely inalienable characteristic; while the Sankhya reasons out that the Atman is Feeling Intelligence itself, but teaches, in agreement with the Realistic System, that Atmans are Infinite in number. Finally, the Vedanta establishes that the Atman is not only Intelligence itself, but it is one and the same in all experiencing beings. For these reasons, arguments in support of the Atman, in so far as only its existence as an eternal and infinite, i.e., all-reaching Reality is concerned, can be adduced from all the Standards. We may, however, begin with the following, which is perhaps the most characteristic of the Nyaya-Vaisheshika arguments.

Atman is, Because Consciousness or Experience as Property Must Inhere in Some Reality.

In each experiencing being there is and must be an Atman which is an independent Reality and different from the body, because:—

(a) Consciousness, i.e., Experience in general, is a property¹—consciousness, namely, of things, thoughts and ideas, of feelings, pleasure, pain and so on.
(b) As a property it can have no independent existence of its own.²

There is nothing which is a property and yet has an independent existence, apart from that of which it is a property. A property must inhere in and belong to some Reality. Consciousness, as a property, must also belong to and inhere in some Reality.

(c) The materialist says it inheres in and belongs to the body. But this, for the reasons to be mentioned immediately, is impossible. Therefore, there must be some other Reality in which it inheres; and that to which it belongs is the Atman.³

If Consciousness Be a Reality, then it Is Itself the Atman.

If it be held that consciousness is not a property, and that it is a Reality which has an independent existence, then there is hardly any need for further argument. For in that case the difference would be one of name only. In reality it will be the very thing which is called Atman by the Hindu.⁴

Consciousness Cannot Be a Property of the Body.

But if it be regarded as a property, then it cannot be the property of the body, for the following reasons:—

Because, if it were a property of the body, it would exist also in the various parts of the body and ultimately in the ingredients, i.e., the Bhutas, of which it is composed, even when these were separated from one another and the body divided up. We find in a combined whole no property which cannot also be found in the parts and ingredients of which the whole is made up and into which it can be divided. But this is never the case with any part of the body nor with its ingredients, the Bhutas. And there being no consciousness in the parts and ingredients of the body, consciousness cannot be the property of the body.

If, as an exception to this rule, it be pointed out that intoxicating power is produced by combination of ingredients which severally do not possess it, the objection can be met by saying that this is not quite a proper analogy. For the contention is not that there may not develop in a compound a new or hitherto unobserved property which has not been present in the ingredients, but that when such a compound and therewith a new property are produced, the newly produced property is always found, in howsoever small a degree, even in the smallest part, as still a compound, of the compounded whole. Thus, taking the very example of the objector, if intoxicating power is produced in a cask of whisky, not only was such ‘power’ present, though it might not have been observed, in each of the fermented grains of which the whisky was made but it is not quite lacking in any portion of the whole quantity of the whisky even when such a portion is quite separated and taken away from the whole in the cask. But is consciousness ever found, say, in an arm of the body, or in the solid or liquid matter which constitute the ingredients of the arm, whether before they had been built into or when they are detached from the body?⁵

Consciousness Cannot Be Due to the “Form” of the Body.

Nor can it be maintained that, although consciousness may not be the property of the material ingredients of which the body is composed, it is produced by a combination of them in a particular way. That is to say, it belongs to, or inheres in, the particular form which they produce by their combination. For, consciousness as a property cannot inhere in anything but in some real entity; and a form cannot be said to be a real entity, inasmuch as it has no independent existence of its own.

Consciousness Being a Property of the Body, Individual Consciousness Would Be Only an Aggregate of Consciousnesses.

Moreover, if it be held that there is consciousness in the various ingredients of the body, then it will follow that the consciousness of an individual really is the combination of an immense number of separate consciousnesses. But nobody feels himself as such, that is to say, as many. We all feel ourselves as one and the same individual.

Not only does an individual not feel himself as many, but if really many consciousnesses formed one individual consciousness, then the body would often be either torn to pieces or absolutely inactive. For, it is comparatively a very rare thing to find a large number of conscious entities acting together absolutely with one will and purpose. They generally have different wills and purposes of their own, and if the different members and parts of the body had each a separate consciousness of its own, and at the same time were not subordinate to some other and central consciousness, it is pretty certain that they would often disagree and try to carry out their different wills and purposes; and the result would be a complete disintegration of the body. Or, if the body did not disintegrate, there would be an absolute deadlock of activity, inasmuch as the varying wills and purposes of the different parts of the body would neutralise one another. But as neither this kind of disintegration nor stagnation is ever observed, we must conclude that it is not the separate consciousnesses of the different parts of the body which produce the one individual consciousness.

Perhaps it may be said, that in the event of disagreement, the functions of the body would be carried on by the agreement of the majority. This may often happen. But it is also possible that sometimes the division may be equal and in such circumstances the body is sure to be divided into two parts. No such case, however, is ever known.

If Consciousness Were a Property of the Body then there Could Be No Consciousness of the Body as a Whole.

Finally, it would be equally futile to urge that the will and purpose of the different members of the body, would be controlled and overruled by the will of the body as a whole. For, on the theory that the individual consciousness of a man is merely an aggregate of the consciousnesses of parts, there can be no meaning of the will of the body as a whole, except the aggregate of the wills of its different constituents. For, if it be held that the body as a whole can have its own consciousness and will, as distinguished from, and independent of, the aggregate of the consciousnesses of its various factors, then, such consciousness can be either essential or accidental. For, it cannot be anything else, as there is not a third alternative.

Consciousness Cannot Be Essential to the Body.

But if it were essential to the body, then there would be no death at all, for death is not possible unless consciousness is gone from the body; and it could not leave the body if it were an essential property of the latter. That which is an essential property of a thing cannot possibly leave it; as, for instance, impenetrability, which, as an essential property of matter, can never be absent from it. If it were essential to the body it would be, say, like colour which, being essential, is always with the body as long as it is. Colour is never absent from the body, because it is essential to the body; but this cannot be said of consciousness. It does not endure as long as the body does. Bodies can be found without consciousness, not only after death, but also in a trance or swoon. Therefore consciousness cannot be essential to the body.

Of course, here it may be urged that, although there is no absolute want of colour in the body, there is, at any rate, change of colour. A man, for instance, having white leprosy, will change his colour altogether. Yet, in spite of this change, colour cannot be said to be the property of anything but the body itself. Similarly, what we call consciousness and unconsciousness are merely two properties of the body, one alternating with the other, just as one colour can change into another. This argument would indeed be valid, if it could be proved, that unconsciousness were really a positive property, which could be contrasted with consciousness as one colour can be contrasted with another. But unconsciousness is not such a positive quality. It means only the absolute want of consciousness. That is to say, unconsciousness in a body, as at death, means not the production of a new property, similar in nature, as one colour is similar to another, but the absolute elimination of consciousness. There is no such absolute elimination of colour from the body as long as it lasts. It is true that one colour may succeed another. But there is always some colour in the body, as long as the latter is. This cannot be said of consciousness. It is, therefore, not the essential property of the body.

Consciousness Accidental to the Body.

But if it is not its essential property, then it must be admitted to be accidental to the body, for, as stated above, there can be no third alternative. And if it is accidental, it is evident that the body alone is not the cause or basis of consciousness. There must be something else, some other power or substance, which must come in, so to say, and in some way be related with the body before consciousness is produced in the latter.

And this can be done in two ways,, as may be illustrated by two examples; namely, (a) the reduction, say, of solid gold or silver into a liquid or molten state; and (b) the lighting up of a room, say, with a candle or some other source of light. In the first example, that is, in the reduction of solid gold to a liquid state; the liquidity is the property of the gold itself, although it is produced by means of some other agency, which is introduced, so to say, from outside. In the second example, the illumination of the room cannot be said to be the property of the room itself, the light belonging to the source from which it proceeds. Now the question is: Is consciousness, produced in the body, of the nature of the liquidity produced in solid gold, i.e., belonging to the body itself, although produced by means of some other agency; or, is it the property of the outside agency itself, as the light in the room is of the source of light, which is other than the room itself?

A little reflection will show that consciousness, produced in the body, cannot be the property of the body itself. For consciousness implies, as everyone knows, a relation, namely, between that which is conscious and that of which it is conscious. And it must be admitted that, whether they be essentially one or different—and we shall see that they are different—these two, things are quite distinct from one another at the time when the one is conscious of the other. And if this is admitted, it will further be conceded that of the two it is the first to which consciousness belongs, or, of which it is a property. Let us put the matter a little more concretely. Whether it be absolutely fixed and unchangeable, or ever varying, there is what may be called an “I-ness” in me, and when I am conscious of something, then whatever constitutes my “I-ness” at the moment is, and must be, distinct from this something of which I am conscious. Further, the consciousness at that moment belongs to me, that is to say, what constitutes my “I-ness” at the time. Therefore, it is the property of this “I-ness” in me, and not of that of which I am conscious. This fact, expressed in general terms, means that consciousness is not the property of that of which one is conscious, but of that which is conscious. In other words, it is not the property of the object of consciousness. But body is an object of consciousness; the latter, therefore, cannot be its property.

Being Accidental to the Body, Consciousness Need Not Necessarily Be a Property Inherent in the Body.

In any case, whether consciousness be produced in the bodv like liquidity in solid gold, or like light in a dark room, if it be admitted, as it must be, that consciousness is accidental in the body, and that, for its production in the body, there is, and must be, the need of some other agency, then the theory that consciousness is dependent entirely and exclusively upon the body falls to the ground. For, it has to be admitted that consciousness is produced by the combination of the body and something else. This being admitted, it is unreasonable to maintain, as the materialist does, that consciousness is the property of the body only, when it may be equally claimed to be the property of that some other agency, which must come into relation with the body before consciousness can be produced. As a matter of fact, for the reasons stated above, and for others to be mentioned now, it will be found more rational to hold that consciousness belongs to, and is the property of, this other agency rather than that of the body.

Consciousness and Will Must Belong to the Same Reality; but Will Cannot Belong to the Body.

That consciousness cannot be the property of the body will be seen from the following further considerations.

It must be admitted that a desire or will is caused by consciousness. One cannot desire a thing or have any will to act with reference to a thing, unless one is conscious of the thing. Will, in other words, is a phase of consciousness itself. This being so, consciousness must belong to the same thing to which will belongs. Now, if it can be shown that the will does not belong to the body, it will follow that consciousness does not belong to it either. That will does not belong to the body, is clear from the fact that will is different from that which it moves. “The will of the carpenter moves his tools. The will of the warrior moves his sword. And the will of the boy moves his ball.”⁶ In other words, we all move material things by our wills and we know we are different from these material things. And if other material things are moved by wills which are different from them, it must be admitted that the will which moves the body itself, as it does move, must be different from the body, because the body is also a material thing. That is to say, it must belong to, and be the property of, something else than the body. Hence, as will and consciousness are inseparable, consciousness must also belong to that something else to which will belongs and not to the body.

Consciousness Being Property of the Body Would Be Perceived by Other Bodies.

Moreover, if consciousness were a property of the body, it would be perceived by others than the owner of the body. For properties of material things are perceived by all who are provided with the necessary senses. But the consciousness of A can never be perceived by B. Therefore it cannot be the property of the body which is a material thing.

Consciousness Belongs to What Makes Use of the Body.

Again, we find that all made-up things are so made up by, and for the use of, others than the things themselves. A house is a made-up thing, and it is made up by and exists for the use of a man, that is to say, a something other than the house itself. This will be found true of all made-up things. And the body is a made-up thing. It must, therefore, belong to something else other than the body by which it is used. But it can be used only by a something that has consciousness; that is to say, the consciousness belongs not to the body but to that which uses it for its own purposes.

Consciousness Belongs to What Feels Itself to Be the Possessor of the Body.

Then again, there is the universal feeling of the body being a possession, and a possession implies a possessor. This possessor shows itself in a general way every time a man says: ‘It is my body.’ But it shows itself most strongly and clearly when a man has, let us say, a diseased arm or leg amputated, and he says or feels: ‘I, as possessor of the body, have given up a part of it.’ And if there is a possessor of the body, it is clear that consciousness belongs to that possessor and not to the body.

There Would be no Consciousness at All if it Were a Property of the Body.

Moreover, if consciousness were the property of the body, there could be no consciousness at all. For the body, like any other material thing, is an object of consciousness. And if consciousness were a property of the body then that would mean that the property of a thing had the thing itself as its object, which would be tantamount to saying that a thing acted on itself. This is impossible. One might as well say that fire can burn itself. And as a thing cannot act on itself, that is to say, cannot have the thing itself as the object of its operation, and as consciousness of the body must have the body as its object of operation, there could be no consciousness whatever if it were a property of the body.

Then again, our inability to realise consciousness apart from the body is hardly conclusive proof of the theory that experience is the property of the body.⁷ We can indeed be certain of the existence of consciousness and all that it implies as long as the body exists in a living state, but we cannot be so certain of its complete non-existence when the body does not exist. For it is equally as possible that even after the body has died, the consciousness should continue to exist in some other state, as that it may altogether cease. And should consciousness persist, after the death of the body, it cannot surely be the property of the latter. In any case this very doubt is enough to prevent our accepting as truth the theory that consciousness is a property of the body.

Body May Be a Mere Auxiliary.

Moreover, if it is concluded that consciousness is a property of the body because it takes place where there is a body and does not take place where there is none, we may as well conclude that visual perception is a property of light because it takes place where there is light and does not take place where light is absent. But as we can never accept this second conclusion as valid there is no reason why we should accept the first. For who can say that the body is not a mere auxiliary to consciousness as light is to visual perception?

Consciousness Can Be Had Without the Body.

Finally, it is not true that the body is absolutely required as an auxiliary of consciousness, as we shall see later on.⁸ While thus the chief argument in favour of the contention that consciousness is a property of the body is not conclusive, that theory cannot be accepted, for reasons given above, even as a possibility.

Consciousness Cannot Be Merely a Function of the Brain.

And if consciousness cannot be a property of the body as a whole, neither can it be a mere function of the brain.⁹ This brain theory of the brain consciousness was never advanced in ancient India; but it has been treated by a modern Hindu philosopher of a genuinely Hindu school and education.¹⁰ It has been shown by him that the brain theory of consciousness is open to exactly the same objections as the one which maintains that consciousness is a property of the body as a whole. Brain may be indeed needed as an instrument for the expression of consciousness, as the body as a whole is needed. But it is not a question of an instrument of consciousness that we are now considering. The point at issue is one of the basis in which consciousness inheres as a property. The argument that when the brain is in order there is consciousness, and when it is out of order consciousness vanishes, can only prove that brain is needed for the expression of consciousness; but not that consciousness is inherent in the brain or that it is a property of the same. It might as well be said that vision is inherent in the eye; because if a man has his eye in good order he has good vision and if it is out of order he sees badly. All that such a fact can prove is that the eye is merely an instrument of vision, but not that vision is inherent in the eye. In the same way the brain may be merely an instrument of consciousness but there is no fact known which can prove that it is the basis in which consciousness is inherent as a property.

Atman is That in Which Consciousness Inheres.

Thus, as consciousness cannot be the property of the body or brain, it must belong to and inhere in something— some Reality which is other than and independent of the body. This Reality is called Atman or the ultimate self of an experiencing being.

Without an Atman there Can Be no Memory.

That such an Atman exists in each experiencing being will also be evident by a consideration of the problem of memory. If there were no Atman independent of and other than the body, there could be no memory of the experiences we have had through our bodies. For the body of a man, like that of any other living entity, is at no time a mere aggregate of the parts and particles of which it is composed. It is, on the contrary, a secondary unit or an organic whole (Sanghata¹¹ or Avayavin) which is very different from, and something other than, a mere aggregate. If the body were a mere aggregate of particles, then the experiences which a man as an individual has through, and by means of, bis body would be merely an aggregate of the experiences which the different parts and particles have as separate, independent and independently conscious entities. But this is a position which we have seen cannot be sustained. No one can possibly conceive of himself, it may be repeated, as any but an individual and individually whole experiencer or conscious entity, and not a mere aggregate of a number of separate ones.

Body Is an Organic Whole, i.e. a Secondary Unit.

This being so, we must regard the body as an organic whole, that is, a something which is, perhaps more, and certainly other, than a mere aggregate.

And if it is an organic whole, and if there be no other individual and no Atman beyond the body, then the impressions and memory of experiences which a man has as an individual must be retained in the body as a whole and not specially in any parts or particles of it as separate entities.

But if it is true that the body is not a mere aggregate of particles but an organic whole, and that experiences are had, and impressions thereof retained, in only the body as such a whole, then, in the life of, and as, an individual, these impressions cannot possibly be transmitted from the body of infancy to those of youth and manhood and from the bodies of youth and manhood to that of old age.

Body as an Organic Whole Is Entirely Different at Different Stages of Life.

For these bodies as wholes are not one but entirely different from one another, and impressions inherent in one whole cannot possibly migrate into some other and separate whole.¹²

The point may perhaps be made clearer in the following way:—

Let a, b, c, d, e, f, etc., be particles of matter which come into, and compose, the body at different stages of life; and let the body in youth be composed of a, b, c, and d. Then, for reasons stated above, the body of youth will be not merely the aggregate of (a+b+c+d), but an organic whole, composed no doubt of these particles, but, as an organic whole, a different entity altogether and quite distinct from the mere aggregate of the components. Let this new entity be called α.

Now α, but not the mere aggregate (a+b+c+d), being the body of youth, the impressions of that age are, for reasons given above, inherent not in the mere aggregate of the components but in the new entity α.

Now suppose some of the particles pass out and others come in, some to take the places of the particles that are gone, others to add greater magnitude to the body; that is to say, let the body pass from youth to manhood. At this stage let its component factors be:—

e + f + c + d + g + h

namely, e and f as substitutes for the old particles a and b, and g and h as additional ones. Here again the body, as an organic whole, is not the mere aggregate of the components, nor even an entity representing

[(e+f)+{α-(a+b)}+(g+h)]

but a totally new entity β. It cannot be simply

[(e+f)+{α—(a+b)}+(g+h)]

for two reasons. First, this would mean that this new body of manhood is a mere aggregate of components which in this case would no doubt be the new particles coming in as particles, joined together with α as a whole minus some of its original factors. But we have seen that a body is not, and cannot be, a mere aggregate of components and therefore it cannot be merely

[(e+f)+{α—(a+b)}+(g+h)]

Secondly, when β is produced there exists no α at all, so that as α it could enter into the composition of β. For α was an organic whole consisting of certain definite factors; and when some of those factors were removed, as α ceased to exist; and what remained behind was not {α—(a+b)}, but merely the particles c and d. These latter, together with the other and newly added particles produced a new organic whole, a new entity β, which must be totally different from α,—as different as x is from y, or a from b.

This being so, there is absolutely no connection between α and β. Therefore the impressions inherent in α cannot possibly pass on to β. And as they cannot pass from α to β and from β to ϒ, that is, from the body of one stage to that of another, there can be no memory of youth in manhood, or of manhood in old age. But such memory exists. We must, therefore, conclude that there must be some other entity above and beyond the body in which impressions of experiences inhere and which does not change with the changing body, but remains with them all, connecting α with β and β with ϒ. And because it remains with them all, it carries on the impressions of one age to another and thus makes memory of different ages possible. This entity is the Atman.

It has been suggested that, as the body does not change at once, impressions could be retained as the shape and form is retained in fossils. This argument, would be valid if the body were a mere aggregate; but we have seen it cannot be so. It not being a mere aggregate, the organic whole changes every moment, as a whole, but not bit by bit as the dead body of an animal or plant changes into a fossil.

Dogmatic Assertions Passed as Reasoning. The Strange Position of One Denying Atman.

Finally, it may perhaps be argued:—

We know that particles change; we also know that impressions persist and memory is a fact. We must, therefore, suppose that impressions are somehow transferred from old particles to the new ones; but we need not suppose that they are retained in something else, which is other than the particles themselves.

We might, indeed, argue like this, if we could positively prove that there really is nothing beyond the body; and the argument in those circumstances would be quite valid. But nobody has so far positively proved that there is no Atman. In the absence of any such proof, the above style of argument is only another name for merely dogmatic assertions. And it is the more objectionable, because the weight of evidence distinctly points to the existence of something beyond the body, of which consciousness is the property and in which impressions inhere. If, in spite of all the evidences in its support and of their reasonableness, we do not admit the existence of the Atman, we are driven to invent explanations which are either merely dogmatic assertions, only thinly veiled as in the line of argument just referred to, or so absurd and chimerical that it is difficult to see how people can accept them and yet refuse the doctrine of the Atman which, as a matter of fact, is the simplest.¹³ If we admit that an independent Atman exists, we explain things in the simplest way and we see at once how it is possible to remember experiences even when the body is completely changed.

Self-Identity Proves Atman.

That there is, in each sentient being, an Atman which is independent of the body, is also evident from the feeling of self-identity. For not only does a man remember the experiences of childhood in manhood, and of manhood in old age, but he feels himself really to be one and the same being at these different stages. He never thinks of himself as many in the same way as he does of his bodies. He feels and can say: ‘I who saw in my childhood my parents, I, the same being, now in my old age, see my children and my grandchildren.’¹⁴ This is the universal experience. From this, it must be concluded, that the entity which feels itself as thus being present and associated with all these everchanging and mutually exclusive bodies, is different from them all. For, it may be laid down as a principle that, “if a thing remains the same in the midst of a number of changing or mutually exclusive things, then the thing existing with and accompanying them all, is different from the changing and mutually exclusive things. For instance, if, in the midst of a large number of flowers which are different from one another and mutually exclusive, we find a thread that runs through them all and makes a garland possible, then it is certain that the thread is different from the flowers.’’¹⁵ Similarly, although the body of childhood, youth and old age are mutually exclusive, there runs through them the thread of that something which perceives itself as the I, and therefore, this something must be different from, and other than, these different bodies. And because it is different from the different and changing bodies, and because it is with every one of them all the time, while they are changing, it is possible for man to remember the experiences of his childhood and youth in old age. If it were not so there could be no memory of childhood or youth in old age.

”Theory of Brain-Selfhood.”

As stated before, the theory that consciousness is only a function of the brain was never advanced in ancient India. The above arguments are directed against the theory that consciousness or experience is the property generally of the body, and that there is no Atman above and beyond such a body. But they can be used equally against the modern European “theory of Brain-selfhood” as it has been called in Sanskrit (Mastishkatmavada).¹⁶

‘Psychical Phenomena’ as Proofs of Atman.

That there is an Atman, independent of the body in each of us, would be still more evident, if we could take into consideration some of those facts, which are now being investigated by the ‘Society for Psychical Research.’ But these are facts which are not yet generally recognised as such in the West. The labours of the Society for Psychical Research may, in time, prove them to be facts for the scientific West. The Hindus think they know them to be facts, and bring them forward as evidence of the existence of the independent Atman. But in view of the general Western attitude in regard to these facts, I shall omit the arguments which are based on them.¹⁷

Without Atman There Can Be No Moral Law.

Further, it could be shown that, if consciousness were the property of the body, and beyond body, there existed nothing else, that is, no Atman, which is not produced or destroyed with the body, then there could be really no moral law in the Universe, and there could be no justice whatever.¹⁸ If it be admitted that there is justice in the Universe, then it will also have to be admitted, as will be shown later on, that man’s consciousness is not the property of his body, but that there is a something else in him which is different from the body and which has lasted from all eternity and will last for ever.

Body Is Not the Atman.

But even without any reference to the moral bearing of the question at issue, perhaps enough has already been said to show that consciousness is not the property of the body, and that there is an Atman which is independent of the body and in which consciousness inheres.

Atman can neither be Identified with Senses, Vitality or Mind.

And if consciousness is not the property of the body, and, therefore, the body is not the Atman, is consciousness the property of, and one with, those powers and faculties of man which are known as

(a) the powers of sensation, or sense-perception, that is, the senses;
(b) vitality (Prana); and
(e) what may be called the Mind (Manas).

And therefore none of them is Atman, the sustainer of consciousness, in an experiencing entity.

Why Atman Cannot Be the Same as Senses.

The Atman in which consciousness inheres and which, therefore, is the real experiencer, cannot be the any of the senses because a man sees a thing with his eyes, and feels it to be hot or cold with his temperature-sense and then he relates the two things together and says: ‘It is one and the same thing that I have felt and seen.’ This could not be possible if the experiencer or Atman were not different, both from the eye and from the temperature-sense. The eye cannot feel the temperature of a thing, nor can the temperature-sense have visions. Nor can the eye say ‘I who am seeing now have also felt the temperatures of something,’ any more than the temperature-sense can feel: ‘It is I who have both the feeling of temperature as well as vision.’ Therefore it must be admitted that there is beyond, and different from, them both a something which relates the experiences that are received by means of both. This something is the Atman which cannot, therefore, be the same as the senses.

Then again, we are aware of the senses as organs, that is, instruments by means of which things are experienced. But instruments, being used, always imply an agent which uses them, and without which they cannot be used. Therefore the senses being used as instruments there must be some agent which uses them. This agent is the Atman; and, as agent, it cannot be the same as the instruments used.

Finally, senses are, as we have seen, things produced by Paramanus and Akasha and as such belong to matter; and matter, as we have also seen, cannot have consciousness as its property.

How Vitality Is Not the Atman.

Nor can the Atman be the same as vitality. For, vitality cannot possibly have any other meaning than merely the special relation of an Atman with a certain form of matter which, by this relation, the Atman organises and builds up, as a means of having experience.¹⁹ And as long as this special relation lasts, all the processes of life, such as breathing and moving, handling and so on, are going on.

Mind and Atman Are Different.

Finally, Atman cannot be the same as the mind. If by mind we mean merely thoughts, ideas, and feelings, it is obvious Atman cannot be any of these. For all these are continually changing, and they are known and experienced as such changing things in much the same way as the body and its changes are known and experienced. And being so experienced, they can no more be the Atman than the body can.

But if by mind is meant a changeless something, by which all these thoughts and ideas are experienced, as much as the changing body and sensible objects are experienced, then, it is obvious, it must be different from the experiencer who experiences things by its means; that is to say, who uses it as an instrument. For, being used as an instrument of experience, it can no more be the same as the experiencer than the eye or the ear can.

Finally, if by mind is meant that something which knows and experiences thoughts and ideas, as much as it experiences the changes in the body, then, that would be merely another name for Atman. For, as their experiencer, it will have to be distinguished, on the one hand, from the thoughts, ideas and feelings of which it is aware, and, on the other, from any instrument, by means of which it may be aware of them. And if the experiencer is so distinguished from both of these latter classes of things which are generally called mind, then it matters little by what name it is called. One may call it mind, if one likes. But in reality it will be the same thing as the Atman. Thus it will be a difference of name only. The fact that the experiencer, whether it be called Atman or Mind, will have to be distinguished from thoughts, ideas and feelings, which are commonly called mind in the West, and from any instruments by means of which these may be experienced by the experiencer cannot be denied. And if one prefers to call the former mind he will have to find a different name for the two latter classes of things. That is all.

Thus we find that there exists the Atman which is independent of and different from the body, senses, vitality and mind, and as such constitutes the eighth Reality taught by the Realistic standard.

Atman is Eternal.

This Atman exists in each conscious being, and is, and must be, eternal. For it cannot either be produced or destroyed. If it be held that it is a thing produced, then we must be told how it is produced, what it is that occasions its production, or what the material is out of which it is produced. If it he said that it is produced with the body, then that will involve all those objections which have been urged against the theory that consciousness is one with the body. And if it is not produced with the body, it cannot be shown to be produced in any other way either. And, if a thing is such that its origin cannot be shown, then it must be held that it also persists for ever. That is to say, as it cannot be shown that Atman is produced from something else, it must be held that it is eternal.

Atman Is Infinite, i.e., All-Pervading, or in Touch with Everything.

Being eternal, it must also be infinite, that is to say, all-pervading or in touch with all things. For, it cannot be like a mathematical point without any magnitude. And a thing to be eternal, must either be a point without magnitude, or must be all-pervading.²⁰ Anything between these two, that is to say, anything of measurable magnitude, must consist of parts. And consisting of parts, it must be divisible; being divisible it cannot be eternal. Therefore, the Atman, being eternal, cannot be conceived as of measurable magnitude.²¹ Nor, as just said, can it be like a point without magnitude. If it were, the Atman would not feel itself, as most people do, one with the whole body which is extended. Therefore the Atman is infinite, that is, all-pervading.

We shall see later on, that the whole universe is moulded into shape by the acts of Atmans. This would be impossible, if they were not in touch with all things. We shall also see that while the different parts of the Universe constitute spheres of experience for the different Atmans, there must at least be one Atman which has the Universe as a whole for its sphere of experience.²² This means, that this Atman is in intimate relation with, and has control over, all things This is possible only because that Atman is all-pervading, i.e., in touch with all things. And if one Atman is all-pervading, all other Atmans must also be the same. For, there is no reason to suppose that in essence they are in any way different from one another. The only difference which there can be between the different Atmans is, that while they are all in general touch with all things, they have intimate and special relations which are different, i.e., more or less extensive, in different cases.

An Infinite Number of Atmans.

Then again, there is an infinite number of Atmans, as many as there are or can be living and conscious entities.²³ If there were not, everybody would be conscious of the feelings and thoughts of everybody else.

Atman Only Sustains Consciousness and Experience.

Finally, the Atman in each is undoubtedly the Reality in which all consciousness inheres. But consciousness or experience is not its essential characteristic.²⁴ These are produced, and inhere, in it, in the same way as sound is produced, and inheres, in Akasha. How they are produced will be seen when we come to deal with what I have called the Synthetic aspect.

Footnotes

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