Philosophy and Religion / J. C. Chatterji: Hindu Realism

    Jagadish Chandra Chatterji

    Hindu Realism

    B—The Synthetic Aspect

    Re-Incarnation

    Atman in Man Is Born Again and Again. Doctrine of Re-Incarnation Clearly Stated and All That It Implies Explained.

    Using the words birth, death and life in the above senses:—

    4 (i) The eternal Atman of a man, together with the eternal Manas, which is its primary and immediate instrument of gaining experience, is born and dies not once but countless times. It has gone on doing this for ever and ever, without a beginning, in an equally beginningless series of universes.1

    (ii) As it does so, each successive birth or incarnation and its possibilities are determined absolutely and in every respect by the Adrishta and Samskara acquired in the previous incarnation or incarnations—Adrishta and Samskara, without which the Atman has never been, because its series of incarnations never began.2 | 3 “It reaps exactly according as it has sown.”

    The Adrishta and Samskara determine:—

    (a) The locality and time, environment, circumstances, possible associations and so on of and in the new birth.

    (b) The family and parentage, with which, on the one hand, the Atman is linked by Adrishta; and which, on the other, can offer it at least some affinity of Samskara, i.e., of character and tendencies both of body and mind, so that the latter in the re-incarnating Atman can find some scope, however small, of manifestation, and thereby can get its deserts in the direction of what may be called his subjective being, as distinguished from his objective situation, possessions and circumstances—that is to say, all that is meant by ‘heredity.’

    (c) The possible period during which that incarnation can last, i.e., possible longevity.4

    (iii) The Samskaras also show themselves as the innate tendencies, capacities and possibilities of character in which children differ from one another.

    (iv) But the Adrishta and Samskara determining a fresh incarnation, or Samskara showing as innate character and capacities of the child, need not necessarily be, and, as is obvious, often cannot be, exactly those acquired in the immediately preceding life.

    Postponed Adrishta how possible.

    Owing to our varied kinds of activities we are daily acquiring worths and tendencies which are often so incompatible with one another that they cannot possibly be actualised together.5 Thus, for instance, a man may acquire two sets of worths; one of which, when actualised, will make him, let us say, poor and miserable from birth, while another will give him a most comfortable and luxurious situation, also from birth.6 | 7 It is obvious these two sets of worths cannot actualise themselves together.

    When one set is operating the other must wait till it finds an opportunity; just as seeds sown in the ground, and then covered with snow, must wait till the snow melts away before they can germinate. This is also the reason, why, in our daily life, many of our acts do not bring about their consequences at once. In fact, it is by virtue of this principle that any potential worths are at all produced. Otherwise, all activities bringing about their results at once, all worths would be only cash-values.

    And what is true of Adrishta, is also true of Samskaras. We cannot simultaneously be both sentimental and cool and calculating; or, at the same time both sickly and robust.

    Thus Adrishtas and Samskaras often being incompatible with one another, some will have to wait (and wait even for long), when others are operating. And it is out of this waiting Adrishtas and Samskaras (which may be of many lives of the past, and even of a very remote past), that a certain portion may determine the next birth of a man; while the Adrishta and Samskara which are being acquired now, may have to wait long for their turn. That is how it may happen that the next incarnation of a man may be very different from what one could possibly expect from his present conduct and character. A bright and keenly intellectual man may be re-born, as a sentimental fellow, and a saintly man may re-appear with many an evil tendency in his nature. Or, one, who has tried all his life to help others, may yet find himself in very undesirable and unfriendly surroundings.

    Nothing Is Lost. ‘Subliminal Self’.

    But, of course, none of the Samskaras or Adrishtas of a man are lost.8 They wait, as it were, behind him, and form a sort of reserve in the background. It is perhaps this reserve which, it would seem, is now being recognized in the West as the ‘sub-liminal self ’ of a man.

    However that may be, the point to note is, that not all the tendencies and capacities which we are now forming or showing in our lives, nor all the worths which we are now acquiring, may show themselves in our next incarnation. Some of them may re-appear in the next birth, or they may all sink down, for a time, into some deep strata of our being, while others may crop up.

    No ‘Gifts.’

    In every case, however, any capacities and tendencies, which may show themselves as inborn in a child, or any circumstances in which it may be born, are only things acquired in the past and are not ‘gifts’ as they are often called.9 | 10

    Re-Incarnation.

    The above ideas together constitute what are called the doctrines of Re-incarnation and Karma (lit., activity, meaning moral causation due to activities which in their turn produce Adrishtas and Samskaras).11 But in reality they form only one doctrine, which in the Nyaya is called simply ‘Pretyabhava.’ We shall refer to the two doctrines together as ‘Re-incarnation,’ except when Karma will have to be specially mentioned.

    Arguments in Support of Re-Incarnation.

    As for arguments in support of Re-incarnation the Nyaya simply says:—

    That the Atman re-incarnates is established by the very fact that it is eternal.12

    This statement of the ancient Nyaya, in so far as it relates to the existence of the Atman previous to its birth in a body, finds a strange parallel in a most modern writer, I mean Dr. Mc Taggart, who says:—

    “Any evidence which will prove immortality will also prove pre-existence. ”13

    The Hindus, however, are of opinion, that, if preexistence of Atmans is admitted, then, from that very admission, will follow, as an inevitable consequence, the doctrine of Re-incarnation also. Hence they have been satisfied chiefly with refuting the idea that the Atman is a perishable thing. And this notion being recognised as refuted, by every body in India, the truth of Re-incarnation was never questioned.

    That is perhaps how Re-incarnation has been so commonly accepted in India. And it being a universally accepted idea among Hindus of all shades, as well as by Buddhists and others, although they have differed as to the exact mode of its operation, none of these people have troubled themselves very much to establish its truth, as a fact, by argument. Still there are many arguments which can be adduced in its support. Of these the following is one14:—

    We have seen that an Atman, during life, is always acquiring Adrishta or Potential Worth. And Adrishta always means possible relation to a new situation. But much of this Adrishta must relate to situations of the same kind in which it is acquired inasmuch as much of the activities, by which Adrishta is acquired, affect things and beings existing in that same kind of situation or state. That is to say, some of the Adrishta acquired in a human state must relate to a human state, which may, still as a human state, be higher or lower than the one in which Adrishta was acquired. Similarly, some of the Adrishta acquired by a superhuman being existing in the super-sensible world must relate to a superhuman state, and so on. We may call this kind of Adrishta, the Adrishta of the same or similar state, or simply similar Adrishta, as distinguished from Adrishta which may produce relations with a situation or state of a kind other than the one in which it is acquired.

    Now there is no man who, at any moment of his life, is without some Adrishta of the same state. For, by our actions, we are always affecting others existing with us in the same state, and always having the consequences of some of these acts at any rate postponed. This being so, when a man dies, the Atman must still have in it some Adrishta of the same state. This means that the Atman has potential relations with a situation of the same kind in which it acquired the Adrishta. If the man does not die at the time when we are supposing him dying, and, if he continues to live till the Adrishta of the same state, which he would otherwise carry with him at death, becomes an actual relation to an actual situation, then, it is obvious, that the situation that would be produced as the result of that Adrishta would be one of a similar kind in which it was acquired, that is to say, a human situation on this earth. And if on his continuing to live, the Adrishta would actualise itself into a situation on this earth, there is no reason to suppose that, simply because he dies, that situation when actualised would change completely and be something other than human and earthly. And if an Adrishta of the same state, acquired during earthly life, can produce a situation, to which the Atman is bound, only on this earth, then it is certain, that the Atman, dying with any Adrishta of the same state, must be re-born in the state in which the Adrishta was acquired. And as most men have some Adrishta of the same state when they die, it is obvious they must all be re-born on earth.

    Further Arguments in Support of Re-Incarnation.

    That the Atman is born again and again will be evident also from a consideration of the following points15:—

    The body of a man has a beginning as surely as it has an end; but the Atman, as we have seen, is eternal; and being eternal, we cannot think that it has been lying naked, so to say, from all eternity, without an embodiment of some sort. If it could lie naked all these countless aeons, why should it suddenly come to be born? It cannot be said that an Atman suddenly makes a resolve to be born and is born. For, in that case, we have first to show the antecedents which can lead to such a resolve; because we know of no resolves which are made without antecedents consisting of thoughts, ideas and perceptions. Secondly, if an Atman came to be born out of its own choice, by making a sudden resolve, it would be born only under conditions which could make it happy. But there are millions of men that are anything but happy in regard to their situations or bodies; and it is unlikely that the Atmans in them would have come to be born out of anything like choice.

    Nor can it be said that it is born, once and all of a sudden, entirely by chance. For, there is a rigid law which guides and governs the body in which the Atman is born, (that is to say, with which it is related) and the surroundings in which the body is found. This body and surroundings form one term of the relation, while the Atman forms the other. In these circumstances it is hardly reasonable to assume that, of the two terms of a relation, while one is guided by law, the other is merely a thing of chance.

    Finally, if it be held that it is God who associates the Atman with a body, and He does so only once, then such a God would be open to the charge of injustice and involved in contradictions.16 He would be unjust and malicious, inasmuch as He associates one Atman, without any reason, with a body where a man cannot but be happy and have pleasant surroundings, while He associates another with a body which can be only a source of misery, and surroundings which can only foster vice. But nobody thinks of God as being unjust or whimsical, and therefore the theory that God associates an Atman with a body, only once, without any reason, must be abandoned.

    And if God cannot associate the Atman with the body only once and for no reason, much less can He create the Atman. For, in the first place, we have seen that the Atman is uncreate and eternal; and secondly, even if it were created, God would be involved in just the same inconsistencies, and would be open to the same charge of injustice and whimsical conduct as in the case of his associating an eternal Atman with a body once and for no reason; for we have to ask: why does he create and place some souls (as Atmans in those circumstances would be called), in pleasant, and others in unpleasant or vice-breeding surroundings?

    Re-Incarnation and Heredity.

    Nor is it of any avail to say that all this can be explained by what is called heredity.17 For the question, raised here, is not: how offsprings resemble their ancestors and parents in bodily characteristics or tendencies, or how they inherit circumstances from them. For that is hardly a problem; it is a fact which anyone can see. But it is: why we come to be born of particular parents, inheriting particular bodies and surroundings, and not of other parents of a superior or inferior nature, and inheriting different bodies and situations of a different character? In other words, the question is: why is a particular Atman connected with one body rather than another? And finally, how it comes to have a body at all? It is a fact, let us say, that a man inherits a miserable body or surroundings, because his parents have miserable bodies and surroundings; and the question is: why does this man or Atman come to be born in a family or surroundings where everything is miserable, everything is conducive only to vice, and not where he can have everything in perfection?

    Of course, if the existence of independent Realities like an Atman be denied, as the Materialist may deny, then such a problem does not arise. But we have seen that, in order to account for consciousness, the existence of Atman as an independent Reality must be admitted. And, if this is admitted, then mere heredity will not and cannot explain the problem. For, to repeat, it will then be: why does one of these Atmans come to inherit a particular body and surroundings rather than another?

    How inadequate the idea of heredity as an explanation of this problem is, can be perhaps best illustrated by the following example. Suppose a man renders service to a State, and thereby deserves a reward in the shape of some money. He gets this money, let us assume, from one of the State Treasuries or Banks with which the State has business. There may be several banks or treasuries of this kind all over the country; and the State, in view, say, of the nearness of his residence, or out of some other consideration, gives the man an order to receive the money from a bank in a certain part of the country. He goes to this bank, cashes his order and gets the amount. Afterwards, as he comes out of the bank with his cash, a crowd of people sees him do so. Then, suppose, these people as an explanation of our man’s getting suddenly wealthy, say: he got wealthy because he got the money from the bank. It is obvious, this can never be the real explanation. That will have to be sought in the fact that the man deserved the wealth by his service.

    In the same way, the explanation of the fact that we get different kinds of bodies and surroundings is not that we get them, or, which is the same thing, inherit them from our parents, but that we deserve to inherit them. And this deserving of ours again can be but the result of our past thoughts and deeds, retained as potential worths or Adrishtas in the Atmans. Of course, we can get what we deserve, such as a good body or a bad body and so on, only in families where these can be had, as the money in our illustration can be had only from a bank or a treasury but not from a beggar’s hut.

    Thus the difficulties which beset the theory of a first and one and only birth of a man on earth are at once removed by the doctrine of Re-incarnation; namely, that the Atman is ceaselessly repeating its births in a beginningless series of lives in a beginningless series of Universes (Samsaras); and that, of these births of the Atman, the successive ones are determined, entirely and absolutely, in regard to their nature, heredity and environment, and even possible longevity, by the activities of the Atman in the preceding ones, the Atman suffering or enjoying exactly as it has acted in the past: it reaps exactly as it has sown.

    Re-Incarnation: Memory of the Past.

    While Re-incarnation thus solves a number of difficulties, the only objection which can be seriously raised against it, namely, that we do not remember our past existences, will be seen to be based on erroneous notions. To begin with, it is not true that we forget entirely everything of our past experience; for a man does possess a memory of the past, a general memory, as we have called it, in the shape of tendencies, faculties and character; that is to say, as Samskaras. What is termed conscience in the West may also be interpreted as only a vague memory of the experiences of the past. Secondly, it is only the details of experience that are not remembered. But if the details of experiences can be forgotten by an accident, as they were in the case of Mr. Hanna, surely they must be forgotten when the old body in which the experiences were had goes to pieces, and a new body is formed. Moreover, we all forget the details of experiences which we had as infants and yet we do not doubt our infancy. But, as a matter of fact, even the details, as stated before, are not entirely lost. As we shall see, by suitable means, they can be, and the Hindus say, have often been, recovered.18

    The question of memory, therefore, is hardly a real objection against Re-incarnation. Before leaving this question of memory, it may be noted here in passing that one of the features which characterise a man of high type, such as a Rishi or a Buddha, is, according to the Hindus, this very fact that he does remember all his past lives and every experience in them.

    Re-Birth as Sub-Human and Super-Human Bings.

    By virtue of this principle of Re-incarnation the Atman may be reborn (for every birth is only a re-birth) not only, as a man but, according to Adrishta, in any of the lower forms of beings which are below man; or it may re-appear, by other Adrishtas, as one of the higher order of beings in the super-sensible world which, as we have seen, exists.19

    How This Is Possible.

    This is possible by so behaving during life, as to acquire Adrishtas not of the same state but other Adrishtas productive of a dissimilar state (which we may call simply dissimilar Adrishta); and by deserving thereby a situation of a sub-human or a super-human order.20 An Atman can acquire dissimilar Adrishtas by its conduct, because being all-pervading, it is at every moment of its life, in relation not only with the world of human beings but with various others. Being in relation with these worlds it can affect them by its conduct, (by its deeds, thoughts, and feelings) as much as it can affect the human world. And just as in consequence of affecting the human world in one way or another, it deserves in the same world a situation of this or that, sort, so does it deserve different situations in the other worlds, in consequence of its affecting them in various ways.

    All Experiencing Beings are Atmans Born in Various States According to Adrishta.

    In this way it happens, that Atmans that were born as beings often appear, according to their Adrishta, in all the varying states grades of existence. In fact, the various experiencing beings, forming the different grades of the universe, sensible and super-sensible, are nothing but Atmans born in these grades.21 | 22It is Atmans alone which are the real experiencers, as we have seen. And the Atmans are constantly changing their situations for others of a similar or dissimilar character, according as, in any given situation, they behave one way or another, that is to say, according as they acquire Adrishta of one kind or another.

    Footnotes

    1. Vaish. Su., Upask., Vivr., V. ii. 17; VI. ii. 15; Prashasta, pp. 280 to 281, 308 and 309.

    2. Nya. Su., Nya; Bhash., I. i. 19; Nya. Var., IV. i. 10; III. i. 19, 22, 25, 26, and 27.

    3. Practically the full doctrine of Reincarnation with all that it implies is given in Prashasta (loc. cit.). I have only arranged the implied ideas differently.

    4. Vivr. VI. ii. 15.

    5. Nya. Bhash., IV. i. 64.

    6. Prashasta, p. 281; Kandali p. 58, line 13; Upask., VI. ii. 16.

    7. The doctrine of postponed Adrishta is specially taught in the Vedanta which calls it Sanchita Karma. But Nya. Bhash., Prashasta, etc., also speak of it as Purva-Karma.

    8. Ibid.

    9. Kandali, p. 53, line 1.

    10. The idea of ‘special gift’ to a believer in Re-incarnation and Karma and justice in the universe is a great anomaly.

    11. Supra.

    12. Nya. Su., IV. i. 10.

    13. Dog. Rel., p. 113.

    14. This is based on common Hindu ideas like those contained in the Smriti passage which Vijnana Bhikshu quotes in his Bhashya on Sankh. Su. III. 3.

    15. The argument that an embodiment cannot come about all of a sudden and without any reason is based on the section on Animittata in Nya. Su., IV. i, 22-24, with Bhash. and Vart. on the same; and also on Nya. Manj., p. 470, lines 5 et seq.

    16. Brah. Su., II. 34-36, etc.

    17. The arguments against heredity are advanced only in modern times by living Hindus. There could be no occasion for such arguments in the past as the ancient Hindus never heard of any such idea.

    18. Upask., V. ii. 18; VI. ii. 16. Yoga Su., II. 39, with Bhash. and Vrit.

    19. Prashasta, pp. 280-281.

    20. See note 14.

    21. Prashasta, p. 39 (bottom).

    22. On the idea that all experiencing beings are in reality Atmans, see Prashasta on ‘Creation and Destruction.’ There he speaks of all beings, high and low (uchchavacha), as being created according to their various Karma or Ashaya. But Ashaya is a thing which belongs to Atmans only.




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