Philosophy and Religion / Vedânta-Sûtras (Brahma Sutras)

Vedânta-Sûtras

Fourth Adhyâya

First Pâda

Reverence to the Highest Self!

1. Repetition (of the mental functions of knowing, meditating, &c., is required) on account of the text giving instruction more than once.

The third adhyâya was taken up chiefly with a discussion of the means of knowledge as related to the higher and lower vidyâs. In the fourth adhyâya we shall now discuss the fruits of knowledge, and as occasion suggests some other topics also.--In the beginning, however, we shall carry on, in a few adhikaranas, a special discussion connected with the means of knowledge. 'Verily the Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be thought, to be reflected on' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5); 'Let a wise Brâhmana after he has discovered him practise wisdom' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 21); 'That it is which we must search out, that it is which we must try to understand' (Kh. Up. VIII, 7. 1).

Concerning these and similar passages a doubt arises whether the mental action referred to in them is to be performed once only or repeatedly.--Once only, the pûrvapakshin says; as in the case of the prayâga-offerings and the like. For thereby the purpose of scripture is accomplished; while to practise repetitions not demanded by scripture would be to accomplish what is not the purpose of scripture.--But passages have been quoted which teach repetition 'it is to be heard, to be thought, to be reflected on,' &c.!--Let us then repeat exactly as scripture says, i.e. let us hear the Self once, let us think it once, let us reflect on it once, and nothing more. But where scripture teaches something once only--viz. in such passages as 'He knows,' 'Let him meditate,' &c.--no repetition has to be practised.--To this we reply as follows. Repetition is to be performed because scripture gives repeated instruction. For the repeated instruction contained in passages such as 'He is to be heard, to be thought, to be reflected on' intimates the repetition of the required mental acts.--But the pûrvapakshin has said above that the repetition is to extend exactly to what scripture says and not to go further!--This is wrong, we reply, because all those mental activities have for their end intuition. For hearing and so on when repeated terminate in intuition, and thus subserve a seen purpose, just as the action of beating. &c., terminates in freeing the rice grains from their husks. Moreover also such terms as 'meditating,' 'being devoted to,' and 'reflecting 'denote actions in which repetition is implied as a quality. Thus we say in ordinary life that a person 'is devoted' to a teacher or a king if he follows him with a mind steadily set on him; and of a wife whose husband has gone on a journey we say that she thinks of him, only if she steadily remembers him with longing. And (that also 'knowing' implies repetition, follows from the fact that) in the Vedânta-texts the terms 'knowing' and 'meditating' are seen to be used one in the place of the other. In some passages the term 'knowing' is used in the beginning and the term 'meditating' in the end; thus e.g. 'He who knows what he knows is thus spoken of by me,' and: Teach me, sir, the deity which you meditate on' (Kh. Up. IV, 1, 4; 2, 2). In other places the text at first speaks of 'meditating' and later on of 'knowing;' thus e.g. 'Let a man meditate on mind as Brahman,' and 'He who knows this shines and warms through his celebrity, fame, and glory of countenance' (Kh. Up. III, 18, 1; 6).--From this it follows that repetition has to be practised there also, where the text gives instruction once only. Where, again, the text gives repeated instruction, repeated performance of the mental acts is directly intimated.

2. And on account of an indicatory mark.

An indicatory mark also gives to understand that repetition is required. For, in the section treating of meditation on the udgîtha, the text rejects the meditation on the udgîtha viewed as the sun, because its result is one sun only, and (in the clause 'Do thou resolve his rays,' &c.) enjoins a meditation on his manifold rays as leading to the possession of many suns (Kh. Up. I, 5, 1; 2); which shows that the repetition of meditations is something well known. Now as other meditations are meditations no less than the one referred to, it follows that repetition holds good for all of them.

Here the following objection may be raised. With regard to those meditations whose fruit is something to be effected repetition may hold good, because thereby superior strength may be imparted to them. But of what use can repetition be with regard to the meditations having for their object the highest Brahman, which present to us Brahman as the universal Self characterised by eternal purity, thought, and freedom? Should it be said that repetition has to be allowed because the knowledge of Brahman being the Self cannot spring up on hearing a text once only, we reply that in that case it will not spring up even when it is heard repeatedly. For if a text such as 'Thou art that' does not originate the true notion of Brahman if heard once, what hope is there that the desired effect should be produced by its repetition?--Perhaps it will be said that a sentence alone is not able to lead to the intuition of a thing; but that a sentence assisted by reasoning may enable us to intuite Brahman as the universal Self. But even in that case repetition would be useless; for the reasoning will lead to the desired intuition even if gone through once only.--Again it will perhaps be said that the sentence and reasoning together effect only a cognition of the generic nature of the object known, not of its specific individual character. When, to exemplify this, a man says that he feels a pain in his heart another person can infer from this statement--and certain accompanying symptoms such as trembling of the limbs--only that there exists a pain in general but is unable to intuite its specific character; all he knows is 'This man suffers a pain.' But what removes ignorance is (not a general knowledge but) the intuitive knowledge of the specific character of something. And repetition serves to produce such knowledge.--This also is not so. For if so much only is done repeatedly even, no specific knowledge can spring up. When a specific character is not cognized through scripture and reasoning being applied once, it will not be cognized through them if applied a hundred times even. Hence whether scripture and reasoning produce specific knowledge or general knowledge, in either case they will do so even if acting once only; and repetition therefore is of no use. Nor can it be laid down as a binding rule that scripture and reasoning, applied once, in no case produce intuitive knowledge; for their effect will after all depend on the various degrees of intelligence of those who wish to learn. Moreover a certain use of repetition may be admitted in the case of worldly things which consist of several parts and possess generic character as well as individual difference; for there the student may grasp by one act of attention one part of the object, and by another act another part; so e.g. in the case of long chapters to be studied. But in order to reach a true knowledge of Brahman whose Self is mere intelligence and which therefore is destitute of generic character as well as specific difference there clearly is no need of repetition.

To this we make the following reply. Repetition would indeed be useless for him who is able to cognize the true nature of Brahman even if enounced once only in the sentence 'Thou art that.' But he who is not able to do that, for him repetition is of use. For this reason the teacher in the Khândogya, having given instruction in the sentence 'Thou art that, O Svetaketu,' and being again and again asked by his pupil--'Please, sir, inform me still more'--removes his pupil's reasons for doubt, and again and again repeats the instruction 'Thou art that.' We have already given an analogous explanation of the passage 'The Self is to be heard, to be thought, to be reflected upon.'--But has not the pûrvapakshin declared that if the first enunciation of the sentence 'Thou art that' is not able to effect an intuition of its sense, repetition will likewise fail of the desired effect?--This objection, we reply, is without force, because the alleged impossibility is not confirmed by observation. For we observe that men by again and again repeating a sentence which they, on the first hearing, had understood imperfectly only, gradually rid themselves of all misconceptions and arrive at a full understanding of the true sense.--Moreover the sentence 'Thou art that' teaches that what is denoted by the term 'thou' is identical with what is denoted by 'that.' Now the latter term denotes the subject of the entire section, viz. the thinking Brahman which is the cause of the origin and so on of the world; which is known from other passages such as 'Brahman which is true knowledge, infinite' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'Brahman that is knowledge and bliss' (Bri. Up. III, 9, 28); 'That Brahman is unseen, but seeing; unknown, but knowing' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 11); 'not produced' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2); 'not subject to old age, not subject to death' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 25); 'not coarse, not fine; not short, not long' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 8). In these passages terms such as 'not produced' deny the different phases of existence such as origination; such terms as 'not coarse' deny of it the qualities of substances such as coarseness; and such terms as 'knowledge' declare that the luminousness of intelligence constitutes its nature. The entity thus described--which is free from all the qualities of transmigratory existence, has consciousness for its Self and is called Brahman--is known, by all students of the Vedânta, as what is denoted by the term 'that.' They likewise know that what is denoted by the term 'thou' is the inward Self (pratyagâtman); which is the agent in seeing and hearing, is (successively) apprehended as the inward Self of all the outward involucra beginning with the gross body (cp. Taitt. Up.), and finally ascertained as of the nature of intelligence. Now in the case of those persons for whom the meaning of these two terms is obstructed by ignorance, doubt, and misconception, the sentence 'Thou art that' cannot produce a right knowledge of its sense, since the knowledge of the sense of a sentence presupposes the knowledge of the sense of the words; for them therefore the repetition of the scripture text and of reasoning must be assumed to have a purpose, viz. the discernment of the true sense of the words.--And although the object to be known, viz. the Self, does not consist of parts, yet men wrongly superimpose upon it the attribute of being made up of many parts, such as the body, the senses, the manas, the buddhi, the objects of the senses, the sensations, and so on. Now by one act of attention we may discard one of these parts, and by another act of attention another part; so that a successively progressing cognition may very well take place. This however is merely an antecedent of the (true) knowledge of the Self (in which there can be no successive stages).

Those quick-witted persons, on the other hand, in whose mind the sense of the words is not obstructed by ignorance, doubt, and misconception, are able to intuite the sense of the sentence 'Thou art that' on its first enunciation even, and for them therefore repetition is not required. For the knowledge of the Self having once sprung up discards all ignorance; so that in this case no progressive process of cognition can be acknowledged.--All this might be so--an objection is raised--if cognition did spring up in any mind in the way described. (But this is not the case); for the cognition of the Self being subject to pain and so on has such strength that nobody ever reaches the cognition of all absence of pain and so on.--This objection, we reply, is without force; for it can be shown that the conceit of the Self being subject to pain, &c., is a wrong conceit, no less than the conceit of the body being the Self. For we clearly observe that when the body is cut or burned a wrong notion springs up, 'I am being cut,' 'I am being burned;' and similarly we observe that when sons, friends, &c. who are even more external to the Self than one's own body--suffer affliction, that affliction is wrongly attributed to the Self. Analogous to these cases is the conceit of the Self being subject to pain, &c.; for like the body and so on, the condition of being subject to pain is observed as something external to intelligence. This moreover follows from its not being continued in such states as dreamless sleep and the like; while scripture expressly declares that in deep sleep intelligence suffers no interruption, 'And when there he does not see, yet he is seeing,' &c. (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 22). Hence the intuition of the Self consists in the knowledge, 'My Self is pure intelligence free from all pain.' For him who possesses that knowledge there remains no other work. Thus scripture says, 'What shall we do with offspring, we who have this Self and this world' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22). And Smriti also says, 'But that man who loves the Self, is satisfied by the Self and has all his longings stilled by the Self only, for him there is no further work' (Bha. Gîtâ III, 12).--For him, on the other hand, who does not reach that intuition all at once, we admit repetition, in order that the desired intuition may be brought about. He also, however, must not be moved towards repetition in such a way as to make him lose the true sense of the teaching, 'Thou art that.' In the mind of one on whom repetition is enjoined as a duty, there arise infallibly notions opposed to the true notion of Brahman, such as 'I have a claim on this (knowledge of the Self) as an agent; this is to be done by me ¹.' But if a learner, naturally slow-minded, is about altogether to dismiss from his mind the purport of the sentence, because it does not reveal itself to him, it is permissible to fortify him in the understanding of that sense by means of reasoning on the texts relative to repetition and so on.--All this establishes the conclusion that, also in the case of cognitions of the highest Brahman, the instruction leading to such cognition may be repeated.

3. But as the Self (scriptural texts) acknowledge and make us comprehend (the Lord).

The Sûtrakâra now considers the question whether the highest Self whose characteristics scripture declares is to be understood as the 'I' or as different from me.--But how can a doubt arise, considering that scripture exhibits the term 'Self' whose sphere is the inward Self?--This term 'Self'--a reply may be given--may be taken in its primary sense, provided it be possible to view the individual soul and the Lord as non-different; but in the other case the term has to be taken in a secondary (metaphorical) sense only ².

The pûrvapakshin maintains that the term 'Self is not to be taken as meaning the 'I.' For that which possesses the qualities of being free from all evil, &c., cannot be understood as possessing qualities of a contrary nature, nor can that which possesses those contrary qualities be understood as being free from all evil and so on. But the highest Lord possesses the qualities of being free from all evil, &c., and the embodied Self is characterised by qualities of a contrary nature.--Moreover, if the transmigrating soul constituted the Self of the Lord, it would follow that he is no Lord, and thus scripture would lose its meaning; while, if the Lord constituted the Self of the individual soul, the latter would not be entitled (to works and knowledge), and scripture would thus also lose its meaning. The latter assumption would moreover run counter to perception and the other means of proof.--Should it be said that, although the Lord and the soul are different, they yet must be contemplated as identical, on the basis of scripture, just as Vishnu and other divinities are contemplated in images and so on; the answer is that this contemplation may take place, but that therefrom we must not conclude that the Lord is the real Self of the transmigrating soul.

To all this we make the following reply. The highest Lord must be understood as the Self. For in a chapter treating of the highest Lord the Gâbâlas acknowledge him to be the Self, 'Thou indeed I am. O holy divinity; I indeed thou art, O divinity!'--In the same light other texts have to be viewed, which also acknowledge the Lord as the Self, such as 'I am Brahman' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10). Moreover certain Vedânta-texts make us comprehend the Lord as the Self, 'Thy Self is this which is within all' (Bri. Up. III. 4, 1); 'He is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal' (Bri. Up. III, 7, 3); 'That is the True, that is the Self, thou art that' (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7).--Nor can we admit the truth of the assertion, made by the pûrvapakshin, that all these passages teach merely a contemplation (of the Lord) in certain symbols, analogous to the contemplation of Vishnu in an image. For that would firstly involve that the texts have not to be understood in their primary sense ³; and in the second place there is a difference of syntactical form. For where scripture intends the contemplation of something in a symbol, it conveys its meaning through a single enunciation such as 'Brahman is Mind' (Kh. Up. III, 18, 1), or 'Brahman is Âditya' (Kh. Up. III, 10, 1). But in the passage quoted above, scripture says, 'I am Thou and thou art I.' As here the form of expression differs from that of texts teaching the contemplation of symbols, the passage must be understood as teaching non-difference. This moreover follows from the express prohibition of the view of difference which a number of scriptural texts convey. Compare e.g. 'Now if a man worships another deity, thinking the deity is one and he another, he does not know' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10); 'From death to death goes he who here perceives any diversity' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19); 'Whosoever looks for anything elsewhere than in the Self is abandoned by everything' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6).--Nor is there any force in the objection that things with contrary qualities cannot be identical; for this opposition of qualities can be shown to be false.--Nor is it true that from our doctrine it would follow that the Lord is not a Lord. For in these matters scripture alone is authoritative, and we, moreover, do not at all admit that scripture teaches the Lord to be the Self of the transmigrating soul, but maintain that by denying the transmigrating character of the soul it aims at teaching that the soul is the Self of the Lord. From this it follows that the non-dual Lord is free from all evil qualities, and that to ascribe to him contrary qualities is an error.--Nor is it true that the doctrine of identity would imply that nobody is entitled to works, &c., and is contrary to perception and so on. For we admit that before true knowledge springs up, the soul is implicated in the transmigratory state, and that this state constitutes the sphere of the operation of perception and so on. On the other hand texts such as 'But when the Self only has become all this, how should he see another?' &c., teach that as soon as true knowledge springs up, perception, &c., are no longer valid.--Nor do we mind your objecting that if perception, &c., cease to be valid, scripture itself ceases to be so; for this conclusion is just what we assume. For on the ground of the text, 'Then a father is not a father' up to 'Then the Vedas are not Vedas' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 22), we ourselves assume that when knowledge springs up scripture ceases to be valid.--And should you ask who then is characterised by the absence of true knowledge, we reply: You yourself who ask this question!--And if you retort, 'But I am the Lord as declared by scripture,' we reply, 'Very well, if you have arrived at that knowledge, then there is nobody who does not possess such knowledge.'--This also disposes of the objection, urged by some, that a system of non-duality cannot be established because the Self is affected with duality by Nescience.

Hence we must fix our minds on the Lord as being the Self.

4. Not in the symbol (is the Self to be contemplated); for he (the meditating person) (may) not (view symbols as being the Self).

'Let a man meditate on mind as Brahman; this is said with reference to the body. Let a man meditate on ether as Brahman; this is said with reference to the Devas' (Kh. Up. III, 18, 1); 'Âditya is Brahman, this is the doctrine' (Kh. Up. III, 19, 1); 'He who meditates on name as Brahman' (Kh. Up. VII, 1, 5). With regard to these and similar meditations on symbols a doubt arises whether the Self is to be apprehended in them also, or not.

The pûrvapakshin maintains that it is right to apprehend the Self in them also because Brahman is known from scriptural passages as the (universal) Self. For those symbols also are of the nature of Brahman in so far as they are effects of it, and therefore are of the nature of the Self as well.

We must not, our reply runs, attach to symbols the idea of Brahman. For he, i.e. the meditating person, cannot comprehend the heterogeneous symbols as being of the nature of the Self.--Nor is it true that the symbols are of the nature of the Self, because as being effects of Brahman they are of the nature of Brahman; for (from their being of the nature of Brahman) there results the non-existence of (them as) symbols. For the aggregate of names and so on can be viewed as of the nature of Brahman only in so far as the individual character of those effects of Brahman is sublated; and when that character is sublated how then can they be viewed as symbols, and how can the Self be apprehended in them? Nor does it follow from the fact of Brahman being the Self that a contemplation of the Self can be established on the ground of texts teaching a contemplation on Brahman (in certain symbols), since a contemplation of the latter kind does not do away with agentship and the like. For the instruction that Brahman is the Self depends on the doing away with agentship and all other characteristics of transmigratory existence; the injunction of meditations, on the other hand, depends on the non-removal of those characteristics. Hence we cannot establish the apprehension of the Self (in the symbols) on the ground of the meditating person being the same as the symbols. For golden ornaments and figures made of gold are not identical with each other, but only in so far as gold constitutes the Self of both. And that from that oneness (of symbol and meditating person) which depends on Brahman being the Self of all there results non-existence of the symbols (and hence impossibility of the meditations enjoined), we have explained above.--For these reasons the Self is not contemplated in symbols.

5. A contemplation of Brahman (is to be superinduced on symbols of Brahman), on account of the exaltation (thereby bestowed on the symbols).

With regard to the texts quoted above there arises another doubt, viz. whether the contemplation of Âditya and so on is to be superimposed on Brahman, or the contemplation of Brahman on Âditya and so on ⁴.--But whence does this doubt arise?--From the absence of a decisive reason, owing to the grammatical co-ordination. For we observe in the sentences quoted a co-ordination of the term 'Brahman' with the terms 'Âditya,' &c. 'Âditya is Brahman,' 'Prâna is Brahman,' 'Lightning is Brahman;' the text exhibiting the two members of each clause in the same case. And here there is no obvious occasion for co-ordination because the words 'Brahman' on the one hand, and 'Âditya' and so on on the other hand, denote different things; not any more than there exists a relation of co-ordination which could be expressed by the sentence 'The ox is a horse.'--But cannot Brahman and Âditya and so on be viewed as co-ordinated on the basis of the relation connecting a causal substance and its effects, analogously to the case of clay and earthen vessels?--By no means, we reply. For in that case dissolution of the effect would result from its co-ordination with the causal substance, and that--as we have already explained--would imply non-existence of the symbol. Moreover, the scriptural passages would then be statements about the highest Self, and thereby the qualification for meditations would be sublated ⁵; and further the mention of a limited effect would be purposeless ⁶. It follows herefrom that we have to do here with the superimposition of the contemplation of one thing on another thing--just as in the case of the text, 'The Brâhmana is Agni Vaisvânara,'--and the doubt therefore arises the contemplation of which of the two things is to be superimposed on the other.

The pûrvapakshin maintains that there exists no fixed rule for this case, because we have no scriptural text establishing such a rule.--Or else, he says, contemplations on Âditya and so on are exclusively to be superimposed on Brahman. For in this way Brahman is meditated upon by means of contemplations on Âditya, and scripture decides that meditations on Brahman are what is productive of fruits. Hence contemplations on Brahman are not to be superimposed on Âditya and so on.

To this we make the following reply. The contemplation on Brahman is exclusively to be superimposed on Âditya and so on.--Why?--'On account of exaltation.' For thus Âditya and so on are viewed in an exalted way, the contemplation of something higher than they being superimposed on them. Thereby we also comply with a secular rule, viz. the one enjoining that the idea of something higher is to be superimposed upon something lower, as when we view--and speak of--the king's charioteer as a king. This rule must be observed in worldly matters, because to act contrary to it would be disadvantageous; for should we view a king as a charioteer, we should thereby lower him, and that would be no ways beneficial.--But an objection is raised, as the whole matter rests on scriptural authority, the suspicion of any disadvantage cannot arise; and it is, further, not appropriate to define contemplations based on scripture by secular rules!--That might be so, we reply, if the sense of scripture were fully ascertained; but as it is liable to doubt, there is no objection to our having recourse to a secular rule whereby to ascertain it. And as by means of that rule we decide that what scripture means is the superimposition of a higher contemplation on something lower, we should incur loss by superimposing a lower contemplation upon something higher.--As moreover in the passages under discussion the words 'Âditya' and so on stand first, they must, this being not contradictory, be taken in their primary sense. But, as our thought is thus defined by these words taken in their true literal sense, the word 'Brahman,' which supervenes later on, cannot be co-ordinated with them if it also be taken in its true literal sense, and from this it follows that the purport of the passages can only be to enjoin contemplations on Brahman (superinduced on Âditya and so on).--The same sense follows from the circumstance that the word 'Brahman' is, in all the passages under discussion, followed by the word 'iti,' 'thus ⁷.' 'He is to meditate (on Âditya, &c.) as Brahman.' The words 'Âditya' and so on, on the other hand, the text exhibits without any such addition. The passages therefore are clearly analogous to such sentences as 'He views the mother o’ pearl as silver,' in which the word 'mother o’ pearl' denotes mother o’ pearl pure and simple, while the word 'silver' denotes, by implication, the idea of silver; for the person in question merely thinks 'this is silver' while there is no real silver.' Thus our passages also mean, 'He is to view Âditya and so on as Brahman.'--The complementary clauses, moreover, which belong to the passages under discussion ('He who knowing this meditates (upon) Âditya as Brahman;' 'Who meditates (on) speech as Brahman;' 'Who meditates (on) will as Brahman') exhibit the words 'Âditya' and so on in the accusative case, and thereby show them to be the direct objects of the action of meditation ⁸.--Against the remark that in all the mentioned cases Brahman only has to be meditated upon in order that a fruit may result from the meditation, we point out that from the mode of proof used above we infer that (not Brahman but) only Âditya and so on have to be meditated upon. But as in the case of hospitality shown to guests, Brahman, that is the supreme ruler of all, will give the fruit of meditations on Âditya and so on as well. This we have already shown under III, 2, 28. And, after all, Brahman also is meditated upon (in the cases under discussion) in so far as a contemplation on Brahman is superinduced on its symbols, analogously as a contemplation on Vishnu is superinduced on his images.

6. And the ideas of Âditya and so on (are to be superimposed) on the members (of the sacrificial action); owing to the effectuation (of the result of the sacrifice).

'He who burns up these, let a man meditate upon him as udgîtha' (Kh. Up. I, 3, i); 'Let a man meditate on the fivefold Sâman in the worlds' (Kh. Up. II, 2, i); 'Let a man meditate on the sevenfold Sâman in speech' (Kh. Up. II, 8, i); 'This earth is the Rik, fire is Sâman' (Kh. Up. I, 6, i).--With regard to these and similar meditations limited to members of sacrificial action, there arises a doubt whether the text enjoins contemplations on the udgîtha and so on superinduced on Âditya and so on, or else contemplations on Âditya, &c. superinduced on the udgîtha and so on.

No definite rule can here be established, the pûrvapakshin maintains, since there is no basis for such a rule. For in the present case we are unable to ascertain any special pre-eminence, while we were able to do so in the case of Brahman. Of Brahman, which is the cause of the whole world and free from all evil and so on, we can assert definitively that it is superior to Âditya and so on; the udgîtha and so on, on the other hand, are equally mere effects, and we cannot therefore with certainty ascribe to any of them any pre-eminence.--Or else we may decide that the ideas of the udgîtha and so on arc to be superinduced exclusively on Âditya and so on. For the udgîtha and so on are of the nature of sacrificial work, and as it is known that the fruit is attained through the work, Âditya and so on if meditated upon as udgîtha and so on will themselves become of the nature of work and thereby be causes of fruit.--Moreover, the text, 'This earth is the Rik, the fire is the Sâman,' is followed by the complementary passage, 'this Sâman is placed upon this Rik,' where the word 'Rik' denotes the earth and the word 'Sâman' the fire. Now this (viz. this calling the earth 'Rik' and calling the fire 'Sâman') is possible only if the meaning of the passage is that the earth and the fire have to be viewed as Rik and Sâman; not if the Rik and the Sâman were to be contemplated as earth and fire. For the term 'king' is metaphorically applied to the charioteer--and not the term 'charioteer' to the king--the reason being that the charioteer may be viewed as a king.--Again in the text, 'Let a man meditate upon the fivefold Sâman in the world,.' the use of the locative case 'in the worlds' intimates that the meditation on the Sâman is to be superimposed on the worlds as its locus. This is also proved by the analogous passage, 'This Gâyatra Sâman is woven on the vital airs' (Kh. Up. II, 11, 1).--Moreover (as proved before), in passages such as 'Âditya is Brahman, this is the instruction.' Brahman, which is mentioned last, is superimposed on Âditya, which is mentioned first. In the same way the earth, &c., are mentioned first, and the hiṅkâra, &c., mentioned last in passages such as 'The earth is the hiṅkâra' (Kh. Up. II. 2, i).--For all these reasons the idea of members of sacrificial action has to be transferred to Âditya and so on, which are not such members.

To this we make the following reply. The ideas of Âditya and so on are exclusively to be transferred to members of sacrificial action, such as the udgîtha and so on. For what reason?--' On account of effectuation '--that means: Because thus, through their connexion with the supersensuous result (of the sacrificial work under discussion), when the udgîtha and so on are ceremonially qualified by being viewed as Âditya and so on, the sacrificial work is successful ⁹. A scriptural passage--viz. Kh. Up. I, 1.10, 'Whatever one performs with knowledge, faith, and the Upanishad is more powerful'--moreover expressly declares that knowledge causes the success of sacrificial work.--Well then, an objection is raised, let this be admitted with regard to those meditations which have for their result the success of certain works; but how is it with meditations that have independent fruits of their own? Of this latter nature is e.g. the meditation referred to in Kh. Up. II, 2, 3, 'He who knowing this meditates on the fivefold Sâman in the worlds (to him belong the worlds in an ascending and a descending scale).'--In those cases also, we reply, the meditation falls within the sphere of a person entitled to the performance of a certain work, and therefore it is proper to assume that it has a fruit only through its connexion with the supersensuous result of the work under the heading of which it is mentioned; the case being analogous to that of the godohana-vessel ¹⁰.--And as Âditya and so on are of the nature of fruits of action, they may be viewed as superior to the udgîtha and so on which are of the nature of action only. Scriptural texts expressly teach that the reaching of Âditya (the sun) and so on constitutes the fruit of certain works.--Moreover the initial passages, 'Let a man meditate on the syllable Om as the udgîtha,' and 'Of this syllable the full account is this' (Kh. Up. I, 1, 1), represent the udgîtha only as the object of meditation, and only after that the text enjoins the contemplations on Âditya and so on.--Nor can we accept the remark that Âditya and so on being meditated upon as udgîtha, &c., assume thereby the nature of work and thus will be productive of fruit. For pious meditation is in itself of the nature of work, and thus capable of producing a result. And if the udgîtha and so on are meditated upon as Âditya, &c., they do not therefore cease to be of the nature of work.--In the passage, 'This Sâman is placed upon this Rik,' the words 'Rik' and 'Sâman' are employed to denote the earth and Agni by means of implication (lakshanâ), and implication may be based, according to opportunity, either on a less or more remote connexion of sense. Although, therefore, the intention of the passage is to enjoin the contemplation of the Rik and the Sâman as earth and Agni, yet--as the Rik and the Sâman are mentioned separately and as the earth and Agni are mentioned close by--we decide that, on the ground of their connexion with the Rik and Sâman, the words 'Rik' and 'Sâman' are employed to denote them (i.e. earth and Agni) only. For we also cannot altogether deny that the word 'charioteer' may, for some reason or other, metaphorically denote a king.--Moreover the position of the words in the clause, 'Just this (earth) is Rik,' declares that the Rik is of the nature of earth; while if the text wanted to declare that the earth is of the nature of Rik, the words would be arranged as follows, 'this earth is just Rik'--Moreover the concluding clause. 'He who knowing this sings the Sâman,' refers only to a cognition based on a subordinate member (of sacrificial action), not to one based on the earth and so on.--Analogously in the passage, 'Let a man meditate (on) the fivefold Sâman in the worlds,' the worlds--although enounced in the locative case--have to be superimposed on the Sâman, as the circumstance of the 'Sâman' being exhibited in the objective case indicates it to be the object of meditation. For if the worlds are superimposed on the Sâman, the Sâman is meditated upon as the Self of the worlds; while in the opposite case the worlds would be meditated upon as the Self of the Sâman.--The same remark applies to the passage, 'This Gâyatra Sâman is woven on the prânas' (Kh. Up. II, 11, 1).--Where again both members of the sentence are equally exhibited in the objective case, viz. in the passage, 'Let a man meditate on the sevenfold Sâman (as) the sun' (Kh. Up. II, 9, 1), we observe that the introductory passages--viz. 'Meditation on the whole Sâman is good;' 'Thus for the fivefold Sâman;' 'Next for the sevenfold Sâman' (Kh. Up. II, 1, 1; 7, 2; 8, 1)--represent the Sâman only as the object of meditation, and therefrom conclude that Âditya has to be superinduced on it. and not the reverse.--From this very circumstance of the Sâman being the object of meditation, it follows that even in cases where the two members of the sentence have a reverse position--such as 'The earth (is) the hiṅkâra,' &c.--the hiṅkâra, &c., have to be viewed as earth and so on; and not the reverse.--From all this it follows that reflections based on things not forming constituent members of the sacrifice, such as Âditya and so on, are to be superimposed on the udgîtha and the like which are such constituent members.

7. Sitting (a man is to meditate), on account of the possibility.

As meditations connected with members of sacrificial action depend on action, we need not raise the question whether they are to be carried on in a sitting, or any other posture. The same holds good in the case of perfect intuition, since knowledge depends on its object only. With regard to all other meditations, on the other hand, the author of the Sûtras raises the question whether they may be undertaken indifferently by a person standing, sitting, or lying down, or only by a person sitting.

The pûrvapakshin here maintains that as meditation is something mental there can be no restriction as to the attitude of the body.--No, the author of the Sûtras rejoins; 'Sitting' only a man is to meditate.--Why?--'On account of the possibility.' By meditation we understand the lengthened carrying on of an identical train of thought; and of this a man is capable neither when going nor when running, since the act of going and so on tends to distract the mind. The mind of a standing man, again, is directed on maintaining the body in an erect position, and therefore incapable of reflection on any subtle matter. A man lying down, finally, is unawares overcome by slumber. A sitting person, on the other hand, may easily avoid these several untoward occurrences, and is therefore in a position to carry on meditations.

8. And on account of thoughtfulness.

Moreover also the word 'thoughtfulness' denotes a lengthened carrying on of the same train of ideas. Now 'thoughtfulness' we ascribe to those whose mind is concentrated on one and the same object, while their look is fixed and their limbs move only very slightly. We say e.g. that the crane is thoughtful, or that a wife whose husband has gone on a journey is thoughtful. Now such thoughtfulness is easy for those who sit; and we therefore conclude herefrom also that meditation is the occupation of a sitting person.

9. And with reference to immobility (scripture ascribes thought to the earth, &c.).

Moreover, in the passage 'The earth thinks as it were' scripture ascribes thought to the earth, with regard to its immobility. This also helps us to infer that meditation is the occupation of one who is sitting.

10. And Smriti-passages say the same.

Authoritative authors also teach in their Smritis that a sitting posture subserves the act of meditation: cp. e.g. Bha. Gîtâ VI. 11,--Having made a firm seat for one's self on a pure spot.' For the same reason the Yogasâstra teaches different sitting posture, viz. the so-called lotus position and so on.

11. Where concentration of mind (is possible), there (meditation may be carried on), on account of there being no difference.

A doubt here arises with regard to direction, place, and time, viz. whether any restrictive rules exist or not.--Against the view of those who maintain that such rules exist because we have analogous rules concerning the locality, &c., of Vedic works, the Sûtrakâra remarks that all rules concerning direction, place, and time depend on the aim merely; that is to say: Let a man meditate at whatever time, in whatever place and facing whatever region, he may with case manage to concentrate his mind. For while scripture prescribes an easterly direction, the time of forenoon, and a spot sloping towards the cast for certain sacrifices, no such specific rules are recorded for meditation, since the requisite concentration may be managed indifferently anywhere.--But, an objection is raised, some passages record such specific rules, as e.g. the following one, 'Let a man apply himself (to meditation) in a level and clean place, free from pebbles, fire and dust, noises, standing water, and the like, favourable to the mind, not infested by what hurts the eyes, full of caves and shelters' (Svet. Up. II, 10).--Such particular rules are met with indeed; but the teacher being friendly-minded says that there is no binding rule as to the--particulars mentioned therein. The clause 'favourable to the mind' moreover shows that meditation may be carried on wherever concentration of the mind may be attained.

12. Up to death (meditations have to be repeated); for then also it is thus seen in scripture.

The first adhikarana (of the present adhyâya) has established that repetition is to be observed with regard to all meditations. But now a distinction is made. Those meditations which aim at complete knowledge, terminate--in the same way as the beating of the rice grains is terminated by the husks becoming detached from the grains--with their effect being accomplished; for as soon as the effect, i.e. perfect knowledge, has been obtained, no further effort can be commanded since scriptural instruction does not apply to him who knows that Brahman--which is not the object of injunction--constitutes his Self. On the other hand a doubt arises whether the devotee is to repeat those meditations which aim at certain forms of exaltation for a certain time only and then may stop; or whether he is to repeat them again and again as long as he lives.

Here the pûrvapakshin maintains that such meditations are to be carried on for some time only and then to be given up, since this satisfies the demands of those scriptural passages which teach meditations distinguished by repetition.

To this we make the following reply. The devotee is to reiterate those meditations up to his death, since the supersensuous result (of such meditations) is reached by means of the extreme meditation. For such works also as originate a fruit to be enjoyed in a future state of existence presuppose, at the time of death, a creative cognition analogous to the fruit to be produced; as appears from such passages as, 'Endowed with knowledge (i.e. the conception of the fruit to be obtained) he (i.e. the individual soul) goes after that (viz. the fruit) which is connected with that knowledge' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 2); 'Whatever his thought (at the time of death), with that he goes into Prâna, and the Prâna united with light, together with the individual Self, leads on to the world as conceived (at the moment of death)' (Pr. Up. IV, 2, 10). This also follows from the comparison to the caterpillar (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 3). But the meditations under discussion do not, at the time of death, require any other creative cognition but a repetition of themselves. Such meditations therefore as consist in the creative conception of a fruit to be obtained must be repeated up to the moment of death. Analogously the scriptural text, Sat. Brâ. X, 6, 3, 1--'With whatever thought he passes away from this world'--declares that the meditation extends up to the time of death. Similarly Smriti says, 'Remembering whatever form of being he in the end leaves this body, into that same form he ever passes, assimilated to its being' (Bha. Gîtâ VIII, 6); and 'At the time of death with unmoved mind' (Bha. Gîtâ VIII, 10). And that at the moment of death also there remains something to be done, the scriptural passage (Kh. Up. III, 17. 6) also proves. 'Let a man, at the time of death, take refuge with this triad.'

13. On the attainment of this (viz. Brahman) (there take place) the non-clinging and the destruction of later and earlier sins; this being declared (by scripture).

The supplement to the third adhyâya is finished herewith, and an inquiry now begins concerning the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman.--The doubt here presents itself whether, on the attainment of Brahman, sins the results of which are opposed in nature to such attainment are extinguished or not. They cannot possibly be extinguished, the pûrvapakshin maintains, before they have given their results, because the purpose of all works is their result. For we understand from scripture that work possesses the power of producing results; if, therefore, the work would perish without the enjoyment of its result, scripture would thereby be rendered nugatory. Smriti also declares that 'works do not perish.'--But from this it would follow that all scriptural instruction regarding expiatory ceremonies is meaningless!--This objection is without force, we reply, because expiatory ceremonies may be viewed as merely due to certain special occurrences; as is the case with the offering enjoined on the occasion of the house (of one who has established the sacred fireplace) being burned ¹¹.--Let us moreover admit that expiatory ceremonies, because enjoined on account of a person being afflicted by some mischief, may be meant to extinguish that mischief. But there is no analogous injunction of the knowledge of Brahman.--But if we do not admit that the works of him who knows Brahman are extinguished, it follows that he must necessarily enjoy the fruits of his works and thus cannot obtain release!--This follows by no means; but in the same way as the results of works, release will take place in due dependence on place, time, and special causes.--For these reasons the obtainment of Brahman does not imply the cessation of (the consequences of) misdeeds.

To this we make the following reply. On the obtainment of Brahman there take place the non-clinging (to the agent) of the posterior sins and the annihilation of anterior ones.--'On account of this being declared.' For in a chapter treating of the knowledge of Brahman scripture expressly declares that future sins which might be presumed to cling to the agent do not cling to him who knows: 'As water docs not cling to a lotus-leaf, so no evil deed clings to him who knows this' (Kh. Up. IV, 34, 3). Similarly scripture declares the destruction of previously accumulated evil deeds: 'As the fibres of the Ishîkâ reed when thrown into the fire are burned, thus all his sins are burned' (Kh. Up. V, 24, 3). The extinction of works the following passage also declares, 'The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved, extinguished are all his works when He has been beheld who is high and low' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 8).--Nor is there any force in the averment that the assumption of works being extinguished without their fruits having been enjoyed would render scripture futile. For we by no means deny the fruit-producing power of works; this power actually exists; but we maintain that it is counteracted by other causes such as knowledge. Scripture is concerned only with the existence of this power in general, not with its obstruction and non-obstruction. Thus also the Smriti passage, 'For work is not extinguished,' expresses the general rule; for as fruition of the result is the purpose of work, work is not extinguished without such fruition. But it is assumed that evil deeds are extinguished through expiatory ceremonies and the like, on account of scriptural and Smriti passages such as 'All sins transcends he, the murder of a Brâhmana transcends he who offers the asvamedha-sacrifice and who knows it thus' (Tai. Samh. V, 3, 12, 1).--Nor is there any truth in the assertion that expiatory ceremonies are due to certain special occurrences (without possessing the power of extinguishing the evil inherent in such occurrences). For as these expiatory acts are enjoined in connexion with evil events, we may assume that they have for their fruit the destruction of such evil, and are therefore not entitled to assume any other fruit.--Against the objection that knowledge is not actually enjoined with reference to the destruction of evil while expiatory acts are so enjoined, we make the following remark. In the case of the meditations on the qualified Brahman there exists such injunction, and the corresponding complementary passages declare that he who possesses such knowledge obtains lordly power and cessation of all sin. Now there is no reason why the passages should not expressly aim at declaring these two things ¹², and we therefore conclude that the fruit of those vidyâs is the acquisition of lordly power, preceded by the annulment of all sin. In the case of vidyâs referring to Brahman devoid of qualities we indeed have no corresponding injunction; nevertheless the destruction of all works follows from the cognition that our true Self is not an agent. (With relation to these vidyâs about Brahman as devoid of qualities) the term 'non-clinging' shows that, as far as future works are concerned, he who knows Brahman does not enter at all into the state of agency. And as to works past, although he has entered as it were into that state owing to wrong knowledge, yet those works also are dissolved when, through the power of know ledge, wrong cognition comes to an end; this is conveyed by the term 'destruction.' 'That Brahman whose nature it is to be at all times neither agent nor enjoyer. and which is thus opposed in being to the (soul's) previously established state of agency and enjoyment, that Brahman am I; hence I neither was an agent nor an enjoyer at any previous time, nor am I such at the present time, nor shall I be such at any future time;' this is the cognition of the man who knows Brahman. And in this way only final release is possible; for otherwise, i.e. if the chain of works which have been running on from eternity could not be cut short, release could never take place.--Nor can final release be dependent on locality, time, and special causes, as the fruit of works is; for therefrom it would follow that the fruit of knowledge is non-permanent and cannot be.

It therefore is an established conclusion that on attaining Brahman there results the extinction of all sin.

14. Of the other (i.e. good works) also there is, in the same way, non-clinging; but at death.

In the preceding adhikarana it has been shown that, according to scriptural statements, all natural sin--which is the cause of the soul's bondage--does, owing to the power of knowledge, either not cling to the soul or undergo destruction. One might now think that works of religious duty which are enjoined by scripture are not opposed to knowledge also founded on scripture. In order to dispel this notion the reasoning of the last adhikarana is formally extended to the case under discussion. For him who knows there is 'in the same way,' i.e. as in the case of sin, 'non-clinging' and destruction 'of the other also,' i.e. of good works also; because such works also, as productive of their own results, would be apt to obstruct thereby the result of knowledge. Scripture also--in passages such as 'He overcomes both' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22)--declares that good works are extinguished no less than evil ones, and the extinction of works which depends on the cognition of the Self not being an agent is the same in the case of good and of evil works, and moreover there is a passage making a general statement without any distinction, viz. 'And his works are extinguished' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8). And even there where the text mentions evil works only, we must consider good works also to be implied therein, because the results of the latter also are inferior to the result of knowledge. Moreover scripture directly applies the term 'evil works' to good works also, viz. in the passage, Kh. Up. VIII, 4, i, 'Day and night do not pass that bank,' where good works are mentioned together with evil works, and finally the term 'evil' is without any distinction applied to all things mentioned before, 'All evil things turn back from it.'--'But at death.' The word 'but' is meant for emphatical assertion. As it is established that good as well as evil works--which are both causes of bondage--do, owing to the strength of knowledge, on the one hand not cling and on the other hand undergo destruction, there necessarily results final release of him who knows as soon as death takes place.

15. But only those former (works) whose effects have not yet begun (are destroyed by knowledge); because (scripture states) that (i.e. the death of the body) to be the term.

In the two preceding adhikaranas it has been proved that good as well as evil works are annihilated through knowledge. We now have to consider the question whether this annihilation extends, without distinction, to those works whose effects have already begun to operate as well as to those whose effects have not yet begun; or only to works of the latter kind.

Here the pûrvapakshin maintains that on the ground of scriptural passages such as 'He thereby overcomes both,' which refer to all works without any distinction, all works whatever must be considered to undergo destruction.

To this we reply, 'But only those whose effects have not begun.' Former works, i.e. works, whether good or evil, which have been accumulated in previous forms of existence as well as in the current form of existence before the origination of knowledge, are destroyed by the attainment of knowledge only if their fruit has not yet begun to operate. Those works, on the other hand, whose effects have begun and whose results have been half enjoyed--i.e. those very works to which there is due the present state of existence in which the knowledge of Brahman arises--are not destroyed by that knowledge. This opinion is founded on the scriptural passage, 'For him there is delay only as long as he is not delivered (from the body)' (Kh. Up. VI, 14, 2), which fixes the death of the body as the term of the attainment of final release. Were it otherwise, i.e. were all works whatever extinguished by knowledge, there would be no reason for the continuance of the current form of existence, and the rise of knowledge would therefore be immediately followed by the state of final release; in which case scripture would not teach that one has to wait for the death of the body.--But, an objection is raised, the knowledge of the Self being essentially non-active does by its intrinsic power destroy (all) works; how then should it destroy some only and leave others unaffected? We certainly have no right to assume that when fire and seeds come into contact the germinative power of some seeds only is destroyed while that of others remains unimpaired!--The origination of knowledge, we reply, cannot take place without dependence on an aggregate of works whose effects have already begun to operate, and when this dependence has once been entered into, we must--as in the case of the potter's wheel--wait until the motion of that which once has begun to move comes to an end, there being nothing to obstruct it in the interim. The knowledge of our Self being essentially non-active destroys all works by means of refuting wrong knowledge; but wrong knowledge--comparable to the appearance of a double moon--lasts for some time even after it has been refuted, owing to the impression it has made.--Moreover it is not a matter for dispute at all whether the body of him who knows Brahman continues to exist for some time or not. For how can one man contest the fact of another possessing the knowledge of Brahman--vouched for by his heart's conviction--and at the same time continuing to enjoy bodily existence? This same point is explained in scripture and Smriti, where they describe him who stands firm in the highest knowledge.--The final decision therefore is that knowledge effects the destruction of those works only--whether good or evil--whose effects have not yet begun to operate.

16. But the Agnihotra and the like (tend) towards the same effect; scripture showing this.

The reasoning as to evil deeds has been extended to the non-clinging and destruction of good deeds also. Against a notion which now might present itself, viz. that this extension comprehends all good works alike, the Sûtrakâra remarks, 'But the Agnihotra and so on.'--The word 'but' is meant to set that notion aside. Works of permanent obligation enjoined by the Veda, such as the Agnihotra, tend 'towards the same effect,' i e. have the same effect as knowledge. For this is declared by texts such as the following one, 'Brâhmanas seek to know him by the study of the Veda, by sacrifices, by gifts' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22).--But, an objection is raised, as knowledge and works have different effects, it is impossible that they should have one and the same effect!--It is observed, we reply, that sour milk and poison whose ordinary effects are fever and death have for their effects satisfaction and a flourishing state of the body, if the sour milk is mixed with sugar and the poison taken while certain mantras are recited; in the same way works if joined with knowledge may effect final release.--But final release is something not to be effected at all; how then can you declare it to be the effect of works?--Works, we reply, may subserve final release mediately. For in so far as furthering knowledge, work may be spoken of as an indirect cause of final release. For the same reason the equality of effect spoken of above extends only to works past (at the time when knowledge springs up). Because for him who knows Brahman no future Agnihotras and the like are possible, since the attainment of the Self of Brahman--which Brahman is not subject to injunction--lies outside the sphere of sacred precept. In those meditations, on the other hand, which refer to the qualified Brahman, the Self does not cease to be an agent, and consequently future Agnihotras and the like are not excluded. Such works also--because they have no other effect if undertaken without a view to reward--may be brought into connexion with knowledge.

To what works then, it may be asked, does the statement refer made above about the non-clinging and the destruction, and to what works the following statement made in some Sâkhâ about the application of works,' His sons enter upon his inheritance, his friends on his good works, his enemies upon his evil works?'--To this question the next Sûtra replies.

17. For (there is) also (a class of good works) other than this, according to some. (There is agreement) of both (teachers) (as to the fate of those works.)

'For also one other than this,' i.e. there is also a class of good works different from works of permanent obligation, viz. those good works which are performed with a view to a fruit. Of those latter works the passage quoted above from some Sâkhâ ('His friends enter on his good works') teaches the application. And first of those works Sûtra 14 teaches that, in the same way as evil deeds, they do not cling to the doer or else are destroyed. Both teachers, Gaimini as well as Bâdarâyana, are agreed that such works, undertaken for the fulfilment of some special wish, do not contribute towards the origination of true knowledge.

18. For (the text) 'Whatever he does with knowledge' (intimates that).

In the preceding adhikarana the following conclusion has been established:--Works of permanent obligation such as the Agnihotra, if performed by a person desirous of release with a view to release, lead to the extinction of evil deeds committed, thus become a means of the purification of the mind, and thereby cause the attainment of Brahman, which leads to final release; they therefore operate towards the same effect as the knowledge of Brahman. Now the Agnihotra and similar works are either connected with a special knowledge based on the constituent members of the sacrificial work, or absolute (non-connected with such knowledge). This appears from scriptural texts such as 'He who knowing this sacrifices; he who knowing this makes an offering; he who knowing this recites; he who knowing this sings; therefore let a man make him who knows this his Brahman-priest (Kh. Up. IV, 17, i); therefore both perform the work, he who knows this and he who does not know it' (Kh. Up. I, 1, 10).--We have now to consider the question whether only such Agnihotras and so on as are connected with knowledge cause knowledge on the part of him who desires release and thus operate towards the same effect as knowledge; or whether both kinds of works--those connected with knowledge and those not so connected--equally act in that way. The doubt concerning this point arises on the one hand from scriptural passages such as 'That Self they seek to know by sacrifice' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22), which represent sacrifices and the like, without difference, as auxiliary to the knowledge of the Self; and on the other hand from our observing that a superiority is conceded to Agnihotras, &c., if connected with knowledge.

Here the pûrvapakshin maintains that only such sacrificial works as are connected with knowledge are helpful towards the cognition of the Self, since we understand from various scriptural and Smriti passages that works connected with knowledge are superior to those destitute of knowledge; cp. e.g. 'On the very day on which he sacrifices on that day he overcomes death again, he who knows this' (Bri. Up. I, 5, 2); and 'Possesser of this knowledge thou wilt cast off the bonds of action;' 'Action is far inferior to concentration of mind' (Bha. Gîtâ II, 39; 49).

To this the Sûtrakâra replies, 'For what with knowledge only.' It is true that works such as the Agnihotra if joined with knowledge are superior to works destitute of knowledge, in the same way as a Brâhmana possessed of knowledge is superior to one devoid of knowledge. Nevertheless works such as the Agnihotra even if not connected with knowledge are not altogether ineffective; for certain scriptural texts declare that such works are, all of them without any difference, causes of knowledge; so e.g. the passage, 'That Self they seek to know through sacrifices.'--But, as we understand from scripture that works connected with knowledge are superior to those destitute of knowledge, we must suppose that the Agnihotra and the like if unaccompanied by knowledge are inoperative towards the cognition of the Self!--By no means, we reply. The proper assumption is that the Agnihotra and so on, if accompanied by knowledge, possess a greater capability of originating knowledge and therefore are of superior causal efficiency with regard to the cognition of the Self; while the same works if devoid of knowledge possess no such superiority. We cannot, however, admit that the Agnihotra and similar works which scripture, without making any distinction, declares to subserve knowledge (cp. 'they seek to know through sacrifices') should not subserve it. With this our conclusion agrees the scriptural text, 'Whatever he performs with knowledge, faith, and the Upanishad that is more powerful' (Kh. Up. I, 1, 10); for this text--in speaking of the greater power of work joined with knowledge and thus proclaiming the superiority of such work with regard to its effect--intimates thereby that work destitute of knowledge possesses some power towards the same effect. By the 'power' of work we understand its capacity of effecting its purpose. We therefore accept as settled the following conclusion: All works of permanent obligation, such as the Agnihotra--whether joined with or devoid of knowledge--which have been performed before the rise of true knowledge, either in the present state of existence or a former one, by a person desirous of release with a view to release; all such works act, according to their several capacities, as means of the extinction of evil desert which obstructs the attainment of Brahman, and thus become causes of such attainment, subserving the more immediate causes such as the hearing of and reflecting on the sacred texts, faith, meditation, devotion, &c. They therefore operate towards the same effect as the knowledge of Brahman.

19. But having destroyed by fruition the two other (sets of work) he becomes one with Brahman.

It has been shown that all good and evil deeds whose effects have not yet begun are extinguished by the power of knowledge. 'The two others,' on the other hand, i.e. those good and evil works whose effects have begun, a man has at first to exhaust by the fruition of their consequences, and then he becomes one with Brahman. This appears from scriptural passages such as 'For him there is delay so long as he is not delivered (from the body), then he will become one with Brahman'(Kh. Up. VI, 14, 2); and 'Being Brahman he goes to Brahman' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 6).--But, an objection is raised, even when perfect intuition has risen the practical intuition of multiplicity may continue after the death of the body, just as it continued before death; analogously to the visual appearance of a double moon (which may continue even after it has been cognized as false).--Not so, we reply. After the death of the body there no longer exists any cause for such continuance; while up to death there is such a cause, viz. the extinction of the remainder of works to be enjoyed.--But a new aggregate of works will originate a new fruition!--Not so, we reply; since the seed of all such fruition is destroyed. What, on the death of the body, could originate a new period of fruition, is only a new set of works, and works depend on false knowledge; but such false knowledge is completely destroyed by perfect intuition. When therefore the works whose effects have begun are destroyed, the man who knows necessarily enters into the state of perfect isolation.

Footnotes

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